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yes.' These seemingly inconsistent verdicts can be reconciled because the
juries actually answered different questions. The issue before the criminal jury
2
was whether O.J. was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The issue
before the civil jury was whether it was more likely than not that O.J. killed
Nicole and Ronald. Taken together, the juries indicated that they believed
O.J. probably did it, but that there was room for reasonable doubt.4
Absolute certainty is generally unattainable in legal proceedings. As a
result, triers of fact, like the O.J. juries, are given guidance on how to resolve
uncertainty. A primary guide is the standard of proof-the level of confidence
or type of evidence required to decide a case one way or another.5 One method
to calculate the optimal standard of proof is based solely on the utilities of the
possible trial outcomes. 7 This method is formalized in an equation set forth in
the body of this Article. Two points about this method should be emphasized
at the outset: (1) the formula generates a probabilistic standard-for example,
convict only if you are at least ninety percent sure the defendant is guilty; and
(2) the formula is incomplete.
There is a substantial body of literature criticizing this formula on both
grounds. 8 This Article builds upon and adds to this criticism, and argues that
the utility of trial outcomes alone cannot determine the optimal standard of
proof.9 For example, scholars have identified the strength of evidence, the
accuracy of adjudicators, and the merits distribution as factors that must be
1. B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Civil Jury Finds Simpson Liable in Pair of Killings, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al.
2. Id; see also Nina Bernstein, Views ofa Legal Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al.

3. Bernstein, supranote 2, at Al.
4. Whether such doubts are still reasonable is questionable after the publisher labeled
O.J.'s aborted account of the murders, If I Did It, a "'confession."' Julie Bosman, Simpson
PublisherExplains, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at Al l.
5. See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW 64-65 (2006) (explaining
how standards of proof provide guidance on resolving uncertainties).
6. See infra text accompanying note 60 (describing and providing Equation 4); see also
Alan D. Cullison, ProbabilityAnalysis of Judicial Fact-Finding:A Preliminary Outline of the

Subjective Approach, I U. TOL. L. REv. 538, 564-71 (1969) (explaining the theory behind
calculating the optimal standard of proof based on the utilities of difficult trial outcomes).
7.
8.

See infra Equation 4.
Michael L. DeKay, The Diference Between Blackstone-Like Error Ratios and

ProbabilisticStandards of Proof 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 95, 99 (1996) (demonstrating that
probabilistic standards of proof do not guarantee a constant ratio of judicial errors); Michael S.
Pardo & Ronald J. Allen, JuridicalProofand the Best Explanation, 27 LAW & PHIL. 223, 224-25

(2008) (contending that, not only do probabilistic theories incompletely explain the judicial proof
process, but also that they "are parasitic on the more fundamental explanation-based
considerations"); see also Ronald J. Allen, The Restoration of In re Winship: A Comment on
Burdens ofPersuasionin CriminalCases After Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30, 47

n.65 (1977) ("Without knowing the distribution of guilt probabilities of factually innocent and
guilty defendants, we cannot know the actual effect of choosing one standard of proof over
another.").
9.

See LAUDAN, supra note 5, at 69-74.
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considered.1o This Article puts these considerations and others into a new
framework for selecting standards of proof
Critics of the probabilistic approach may be unsatisfied with my treatment of
the first point-framing the standard in probabilistic terms. I adopt the
probabilistic approach without a formal response to the many criticisms
leveled against it. My rationale is three-fold: (1) appellate courts have adopted
the probabilistic approach; (2) the probabilistic approach allows for easier
quantification than alternatives, such as the explanatory approach;" and (3)
most importantly, the implications of my analysis apply regardless of which
approach to standards of proof is adopted. Even the most vociferous critics of
the probabilistic approach would concede that the utilities of trial outcomes are
relevant to selecting a standard of proof. Such critics should also recognize the
relevance and impact of the other factors identified by this Article.
Operationalizing my framework non-probabilistically would be difficult, but
not impossible. Indeed, proponents of other approaches arguably must do so to
account for all the relevant factors.
The goal of this Article is to outline a systematic and complete justification
for selecting between probabilistic standards of proof as a model for future
inquiry. Perhaps the most important conclusion of this Article is that selecting
a standard of proof, absent data that is not realistically attainable, is necessarily
tentative. Some of the factors that go into selecting a standard of proof are
affected by the choice of standard in ways that pure theory cannot predict. One
might throw up one's hands at this point, but that would be a mistake. Courts
and legislators must select standards under conditions of imperfect
information, and the outcomes of real cases hang in the balance. The analysis
set forth in this Article ought to guide the selection of standards of proof, even
though it may not always determine the optimal choice.
This Article principally examines will contests in which a party alleges that
the testator lacked the mental capacity to execute the will;12 it then illustrates
the general applications of that examination. Part I introduces the will-contest
context, asking a deceptively simple question: which standard of proof10. Id. at 73.
11. See, e.g., Michael S. Pardo, Second-OrderProofRules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083, 1102-04
(2009) ("A fact is proven by clear and convincing evidence when the explanation of the evidence
and events in dispute that includes this fact is clearly and convincingly better than explanations
that do not."). A parallel probabilistic instruction might read: a fact is proven by clear-andconvincing evidence when you are at least 75% sure of its truth.
12. The Restatement (Third) of Property explains the standard of mental capacity:
To have mental capacity to make a will, the law requires the testator to be 'of sound
mind.' To be 'of sound mind,' the testator must, when executing a will, be capable of
knowing and understanding in a general way the nature and extent of his or her
property, the natural objects of his or her bounty, and the disposition that he or she is
making of that property, and must also be capable of relating these elements to one
another and forming an orderly desire regarding the disposition of the property.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS

§ 8.1

cmt. c (2003).

Catholic University Law Review

4

[Vol. 60:1

preponderance of the evidence or clear-and-convincing evidence-is better?
Part II provides what I believe to be the first systematic outline of a
mathematical solution to the problem of selecting between two standards of
proof, in any context. Part III discusses the assumptions behind the
mathematics and examines the validity of each assumption and how each
affects the conclusion, if at all. Part IV combines the insights of Parts II and
III and discusses whether a revised answer is warranted and whether a
definitive answer is achievable. Part V considers extensions of the analysis to
standards of proof in three other contexts.
1. THE QUESTION: WHICH STANDARD OF PROOF Is BETTER FOR INCAPACITY
WILL CONTESTS?

At a dinner party Mrs. [Brooke] Astor had at her apartment in
January 2002 for Kofi Annan, Dr. [Henry] Kissinger testified, Mrs.
Astor leaned toward him and asked, "Who is the black fellow who is
sitting on the other side of me?" "Kofi Annan," he said he
And when she later asked if Mr. Annan was
responded.
distinguished, Mr. Kissinger said he told her: "He is a very
distinguished man. He is secretary general of the United Nations."l 3
This testimony was given in a criminal case against Astor's only son,14
Anthony Marshall, in which Marshall was ultimately convicted for, among
other things, taking advantage of Astor's "diminished mental capacity" by
having her amend her will in his favor.' 5 The Astor case was unusual not only
because of the star power of the witnesses, but also because it is very rare for a
will to be challenged in criminal court. Because of the setting, the state
arguably had to prove incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 In the
simultaneous and still-pending will contest in civil court,' the burden is on the
proponent of the will to prove capacity by a preponderance of the evidence.
In New York, where the Astor case was heard, the approach to the burden of
proof in capacity will contests is traditional-the proponent carries the

13.

John Eligon, At Astor Trial, Famous Faces Turn Heads, and Testify, N.Y. TIMES, May

22, 2009, at A23 [hereinafter Eligon, Astor Trial].
14.

Id.

15. People v. Marshall, Indictment No. 6044-07, slip op. at 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 29, 2010),
available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/brookeastor/nymrshll107ind.html; see also John
Eligon, Mrs. Astor's Son Guilty of Taking Tens ofMillions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at Al.

16. 75 AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1091 (2007) ("In criminal cases, the jury should be instructed
that the burden rests upon the state to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable
doubt .... ).
17. In re Astor, 879 N.Y.S.2d 560, 562 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
18. See A. G. Sulzberger, Fate of the Astor Fortune Is Uncertain, Despite a Verdict, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2009, at A25 (noting that, in civil court, the standard of proof is by a
preponderance of the evidence); see, e.g., In re Will of Buckten, 578 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991).
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burden. 19 The modem approach in capacity will contests, followed by a
majority of urisdictions, places the ultimate burden to prove incapacity on the
contestant.2 As noted, civil will contests require a lower standard of proof
than criminal cases.2' In will contests in which testator incapacity is alleged,
most jurisdictions require proof by a preponderance of the evidence.22 That
standard, however, is not universal.23
Some courts lay down a rule, which, in form at least, requires
more than a preponderance. It has been said that the evidence,
especially of insanity, need not be more than to a reasonable
satisfaction, or that insanity must be established by the manifest
weight of the evidence, or that the evidence must be clear, or the
evidence must be strong, or that the evidence must be clear, definite,
and weighty, or that there must be a great preponderance of the
evidence of incapacity, or that the evidence must be clear,
convincing and satisfactory, or the greatest and most satisfactory
evidence of incapacity, or that the evidence must be conclusive, or
cogent and convincing, or evidence like that which is required in a
criminal case to rebut and to overcome the presumption of
-24
innocence.
19.

THOMAS E. ATKINSON,

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS

§

196, at 508 (1937)

("According to the orthodox view the proponent has the burden of proof as to mental
capacity ....
); EUNICE L. Ross & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 6:14, at 6-67 n.39 (2d
ed. 1999) (noting that, in a will contest in New York, "the proponent has the burden of proving
that the testator possesses testamentary capacity").
20. ATKINSON, supra note 19 ("[A] substantial number of courts place this burden on
contestant."); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-407, 8 U.L.A. 87 (Supp. 2010) ("Contestants of a will
have the burden of establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity .... .").
21. Interestingly, Louisiana, for a time, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
testamentary incapacity. In re Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161, 1164-65 (La. 1984) (explaining that
Louisiana previously "likened the requisite burden of proof to that required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in criminal cases") (citing In re Mithoff, 122 So. 886, 887 (La. 1929)).
Louisiana currently requires proof "by clear and convincing evidence that the donor lacked
capacity." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1482(A) (2000).
22. 3 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 29.35, at
574 & n.1 (2004) (citing thirty-three jurisdictions as requiring the preponderance of the evidence
standard to prove capacity); 95 C.J.S. Wills § 40 (2008) ("On the probate of a will, testamentary
capacity ordinarily must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence."). See, e.g., Looney v.
Estate of Wade, 839 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Ark. 1992) (noting that the contesting party "has the
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator lacked mental capacity at
the time the will was executed"); In re Estate of Edwards, 520 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Miss. 1988)
("[T]he proponents must prove the testator's testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the
evidence."); In re Estate of Dion, 623 N.W.2d 720, 729 (N.D. 2001) ("A will contestant has the
burden of proving testamentary incapacity by a preponderance of the evidence."); In re Estate of
Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988) ("[T]he burden is assigned to the contestants to show
by a preponderance of the evidence the claimed testamentary incapacity .....
23. See, e.g., 3 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 22, § 29.35, at 577-78.
24. Id. § 29.35, at 577 (citing case law for a heightened general standard from nine
jurisdictions) (footnotes omitted). Medical clinicians observe the presumption of competence,
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To this list one could add that, in Kentucky, the presumption of capacity
"can only be rebutted by the strongest showing of incapacity." 25 Similarly,
although California courts frequently reiterate that the standard is
preponderance of the evidence, the California Supreme Court has declared that
"there is a strong presumption of competency." 26 Illinois also purports to
adhere to the preponderance of the evidence standard,27 but the Illinois
Supreme Court reversed a jury verdict because the instruction required only a
"slight preponderance of the evidence" 28 and has elsewhere explained that "the
evidence of incapacity must clearly preponderate to authorize the setting aside
of the will." 29
One treatise describes allocation of the burden of proof in incapacity will
contests as "a crazy quilt of apparently conflicting and confusing maxims and
principles which vary from state to state in an astounding variety of verbal
formulae."3 0 Much the same can be said of the diverse views on the requisite
level of proof. The modal heightened standard appears to be clear-andconvincing evidence.31 With slight variations in wording, this is the standard
36
53
34
in Kansas, 32 Louisiana, 33 New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, and

absent "clear evidence" to the contrary. Thomas G. Gutheil, Common Pitfalls in the Evaluation
of Testamentary Capacity, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 514, 515 (2007).
25. Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998); see also Keasler v. Estate of
Keasler, 973 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. App. 1997) (stating that "strong evidence" of incapacity
must be introduced to rebut the presumption of capacity).
26. In re Flatau's Estate, 76 P.2d 506, 508 (Cal. 1938) (emphasis added).
27. Norton v. Clark, 97 N.E. 1079, 1083 (Ill. 1912).
28. Id.
29. Down v. Comstock, 149 N.E. 507, 513 (Ill. 1925) (emphasis added) (quoting Norton v.
Clark, 97 N.E. 1079, 1083 (111.1912)).
30. Ross & REED, supra note 19, § 6:14, at 6-67.
31. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 340, at 487-89 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed.
2006) (stating that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is used in will contests, as well as
other types of cases).
32. In re Estate of Farr, 49 P.3d 415, 426 (Kan. 2002) (requiring "clear, satisfying, and
convincing evidence" to prove testamentary incapacity).
33. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 1482(A) (Supp. 2010) ("A person who challenges the capacity
of a donor must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the donor lacked capacity at the time
the donor . . . executed the testament."); In re Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161, 1164-66 (La. 1984)
(requiring that a party "overcome the presumption of capacity by clear and convincing
evidence").
34. In re Hoover's Estate, 91 A.2d 155, 156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (requiring
clear-and-convincing evidence of testamentary incapacity).
35. In re Estate of Cohen, 284 A.2d 754, 755 (Pa. 1971) (requiring "clear, strong, and
compelling evidence" of incapacity (quoting In re Estate of Brantlinger, 210 A.2d 246, 250
(1965))).
36. Pond's Estate v. Faust, 163 P. 753, 753 (Wash. 1917) (requiring "clear and convincing
evidence").
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Wisconsin. 3 7 The question, then, is whether the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard is better in this context than the preponderance of the evidence
standard.
II. A WORKING ANSWER: THE CLEAR-AND-CONVINCING-EVIDENCE
STANDARD BETTER EFFECTUATES TESTATOR INTENT

The first step in determining which standard of proof is superior is to pick a
criterion. Implementing the testator's intent is the fundamental premise of the
law of wills and the basis for the mental capacity requirement.
Thus, the
question becomes which standard better effectuates testator intent.
The next step in selecting a standard of proof is to define the two standards
in common terms.
The
All burdens of persuasion deal with probabilities.
preponderance standard is a more-likely-than-not rule, under which
the trier of fact rules for the plaintiff if it thinks the chance greater
than 0.5 that the plaintiff is in the right. The reasonable doubt

standard is much higher, perhaps 0.9 or better.
convincing standard is somewhere in between.39

The clear-and-

But where exactly does the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard fall? A
survey of 170 federal judges generated a mean, median, and mode of 0.75 for
40
the clear-and-convincing standard.
To quantify the effect of different standards, one must recognize that there
are four possible outcomes of a fully litigated will contest alleging incapacity.
The contestant can either win or lose, and the testator either had or did not
have capacity.4 1 The following two-by-two box summarizes.
37. In re Estate of Sorenson, 274 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Wis. 1979) (citing In re Estate of
Debrecevich, 109 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Wis. 1961) (noting that the burden of proof in testamentary
capacity cases is "clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence")).
One commentator has described imposition of the clear-and-convincing standard as "the
trend." Laurie Dearman Clark, Comment, Louisiana's New Law on Capacity to Make and
Receive Donations: "Unduly Influenced" by the Common Law?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 183, 212

(1992). 1 see no support for this assertion. Most of the jurisdictions applying the standard have
done so for many years. See, e.g., In re Hoover's Estate, 91 A.2d at 156; Lowrey's Estate, 13 Pa.
D. & C. 532, 535 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1930); Pond's Estate, 163 P. at 753; In re Emerson's Will,
198 N.W. 441, 443-44 (Wis. 1924); see also In re Flatau's Estate, 76 P.2d, 506, 508 (Cal. 1938)
(suggesting a heightened standard); Norton v. Clark, 97 N.E. 1079, 1083 (Ill. 1912) (suggesting a
heightened standard).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. b.
(2003).
39. Brown v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 342, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1988).
40. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or
ConstitutionalGuarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1328 tbl.5 (1982); see also United States v.

Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 tbl. (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reporting a range of 60% to 75% in a survey
of eight federal district judges regarding the probabilities associated with the clear-andconvincing standard of proof).
41. Cf Cullison, supra note 6, at 568 (describing the four possible outcomes of civil suits).
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Table 1. Possible Incapacity Will-Contest Outcomes

Incapacity

No

Will Contestant
Wins
Loses

False Negative
(FN)

True Positive
(TP)

True Negative
(TN)

False Positive
(FP)

Raising the standard of proof-making it more difficult to prove
incapacity-will obviously lead to fewer findings of incapacity, thus
generating more negative and fewer positive outcomes for the contestant. In
order to quantify this effect, we need to make further assumptions. Assume
that each testator falls somewhere on a continuum from 0 to 1, where the
number reflects the probability based on admissible evidence that the testator
lacked capacity. Given the absence of data about the underlying rate of
incapacity, assume a uniform distribution-in other words, assume that exactly
the same number of testators falls at each spot along the continuum. Figure I
reflects the universe of decedents with wills under this distribution. Testators
with capacity are under the diagonal line; testators without capacity are above
the diagonal line. Assuming trials accurately assess the likelihood of
incapacity and apply the preponderance of the evidence standard, the vertical
line at 0.5 separates successful and unsuccessful will contests. The resulting
four regions correspond to the four possible outcomes depicted in Table 1.

The General Theory of Standards of Proof
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Figure 1. Outcomes of Incapacity Will Contests Assuming
Preponderance Standard and Uniform Distribution

TP

*..*
0.5

TN
FP
0

0.5

1

ProbabilityofIncapacity

Additional explanation is in order. Consider first the case where the
probability of incapacity is 0 (the left extreme of the figure). Because the
probability of incapacity is less than 0.5, all wills are probated and a true
negative is the result every time because every testator at this level had
capacity. Hence, the dotted line begins in the upper left corner where
probability of incapacity is 0 and the proportion of decedents is 1.
Look next at the point where the probability of incapacity is 0.5. Half of
decedents at this level lack capacity. Note that, by assumption, a trier of fact
cannot tell which half; she can only observe the probability of incapacity.
Because there is a presumption of capacity, the wills of testators with
borderline capacity are upheld. Half of the time this is correct, resulting in a
true negative; half of the time this is incorrect, resulting in a false negative.
Thus, the dotted line goes through the center of the figure, the 0.5/0.5 point.
Finally, when the testator lacks capacity, all wills will be thrown out, which
explains the dotted line's endpoint at the lower right corner of the figure-all
true positives. The dotted line is linear because, by assumption, the incapacity
rate rises linearly.
Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence test instead elevates the
standard of proof to 0.75. This leads to fewer findings of incapacity and,
therefore, more true and false negatives. Figure 2 depicts the shift graphically.

[Vol. 60: 1
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Figure 2. Outcomes of Incapacity Will Contests Assuming Clear-andConvincing Standard and Uniform Distribution
1

q
0

0.5

0
0

0

0.75

1

Probabilityoflncapacity

From Figures 1 and 2 it should be apparent that the only difference in
outcomes between the preponderance and clear-and-convincing-evidence
standards is in the region between 0.5 and 0.75 likelihood of incapacity. Wills
created by such testators are thrown out under the preponderance standard but
survive under the clear-and-convincing standard. As a result, a mix of true and
false positives under the preponderance standard is replaced by a mix of true
and false negatives (see Figure 3).

2010]1
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Figure 3. Preponderance and Clear-and-Convincing-Evidence
Standards Compared

PR EPOND._E RA:,,EA

CONICN

0

75

If the goal were to minimize the number of errors, the preponderance
standard would clearly prevail. There are far fewer false positives under the
preponderance standard than there are false negatives under the clear-andconvincing standard. Geometry shows that the total-error rate under the
preponderance standard is 0.25; under the clear-and-convincing standard, it is
0.31. Error minimization, however, is not the goal; as stated earlier, the goal is
to advance testator intent. The question, then, is whether the mix of true and
false negatives under the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard better
advances testator intent than the true and false positives that result under the
preponderance standard. If P is the proportion of decedents, and U is utility
(that is, the probability that the distribution matches testator intent), then the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard dominates if
Equation 1.

PTN x UTN + PFN x UFN > PTP x UTP + PFP x UFP

This equation follows Figure 3 by including only the region between 0.5 and
0.75 probability of incapacity.
The right-hand side of the equation simplifies. Both true positives and false
positives result in the estate distribution via the default scheme, generally
intestacy. To evaluate the effect of intestate distribution, let I equal the
likelihood that intestacy matches testator intent. The intestate distribution is
independent of what the will says or whether the testator lacked capacity. It
follows that I= UTP = UFP, so the right side reduces to I x (PTP + PFP). It is

Catholic University Law Review
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not necessary to calculate the individual values of PTP and PFP, because
geometry shows the sum to be 0.25.
The left-hand side of the equation is more difficult because there is good
reason to think UTN # UFN. A true negative affirms a will that was executed
by a testator who had capacity; a false negative results in probate of a will
executed by a testator who lacked capacity. For ease of exposition, let G (for
"good" will) = UTN, and B (for "bad" will) = UFN. Substituting new variable

names, doing mathematics relegated to a footnote,42 and dividing both sides of
the equation by 0.25 lead to the following revised condition for clear-andconvincing superiority:
Equation 2.

0.375

x

G + 0.625

x

B>I

This equation shows that the values of G, B, and I determine which standard
dominates. Barring other defects, it seems safe to assume that a will executed
by a testator with capacity accurately reflects the testator's intent. In symbols,
G = 1. The value of B is more difficult to estimate, however.
Bad wills can be divided into two categories: honest mistakes and intentional
overreaching. In the latter category it seems safe to assume that the resulting
will never (or almost never) effectuates the testator's intent. In the former, at
least some portion of honest mistakes may stumble upon the testator's true
plan-for example, through chance, adherence to prior statements, or the
guiding hand of a knowledgeable lawyer or friend. Thus, a best guess for the
value of B is that it is quite low, but greater than 0.
Fortunately, there are extensive data on the value of I. Four studies of
probated wills estimate I to be 0.28,4 0.31,4 0.23,45 and 0.20.46 These low
values determine the answer to the question. Even if bad wills never effectuate
testator intent (B = 0), the effect of the clear-and-convincing standard, which
upholds more good wills (0.375), is greater than the accuracy of intestacy
under the preponderance standard (highest estimate of 0.31).47 Therefore, the

42.

0.75

PTN =

(1 -x) dx

PFN = 0.25 - PTN

x =0.5

43. Frederick R. Schneider, A Kentucky Study of Will Provisions: Implicationsfor Intestate
Succession Law, 13 N. KY. L. REv. 409, 424-25 (1987). Due to incomplete reporting in the
article, the 0.28 figure is a best estimate. The possible range of values is 0.25 to 0.35.
44.

MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 143 tbl.6-2 (1970).

45. Allison Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241, 252 n.20 (1963).
46. Edward H. Ward & J.H. Beuscher, The InheritanceProcess in Wisconsin, 1950 Wis. L.
REv. 393, 414 tbl.10 (1950).
47. SUSSMAN ET AL., supranote 44.
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six states that have adopted the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard48 have
apparently made the right choice.

111. THE ASSUMPTIONS: THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE ASSUMPTIONS AND THEIR
IMPACT ON THE CHOICE OF A STANDARD OF PROOF

A. Assumption 1: The Uniform Distribution
The true distribution of incapacity among testators is almost certainly not
uniform. A uniform distribution implies an overall incapacity rate of 0.5.
Common sense dictates that the true rate must be much lower; in other words,
the distribution is skewed to the left. But can we be more specific?
One small study of incapacity will contests found the most common
comorbid medical conditions to be dementia syndrome (0.40), alcohol-related
illness (0.28), neurological or psychiatric disorder (0.28), personality disorder
(0.20), and suicide (0.12).49 Based on prevalence estimates and statistics
regarding testation and mortality,50 I estimate that a maximum of 45% of
testate deaths involved a testator with one of these conditions.51 This is a
nearly absolute upper bound on incapacity among testators. The true number

48. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
49. Kenneth I. Shulman et al., Psychiatric Issues in Retrospective Challenges of
Testamentary Capacity, 20 INT'L J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 63, 66-68, 67 tbl. 1 (2005) (n = 25).
See generally Aleksandar A. Jovanovid et al., Medical Reasons for Retrospective Challenges of
Testamentary Capacity, 20 PSYCHIATRIA DANUBINA 485, 490 (2008) (finding a statistically
significant association between diagnoses and testamentary incapacity).
50.

CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Suicide Facts at a Glance (2008),

www.cdc.gov/ncipc/dvp/suicide/suicide-data sheet.pdf (reporting a 0.013 suicide rate in the
United States); Dunham, supra note 45, at 279 tbl.15 (reporting that the average age of wills in
1963 was 4.9 years); Bridget F. Grant et al., Prevalence, Correlates, andDisability ofPersonality
Disorders in the United States: Results from the National Epidemiologic Survey on Alcohol and
Related Conditions,65 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 948, 949, 951 (2004) (noting a 0.148 prevalence of
personality disorders); Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12Month DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 617, 620 tbl.1 (2005) (noting a 0.156 prevalence of severe and moderate DSM-IV
disorders, including alcohol abuse and dependence); Robert A. Stein & Ian G. Fierstein, The
Demography of ProbateAdministration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 86 (1985) ("On the average,
testate decedents executed a will approximately five to seven years prior to their deaths."). Based
on the statistics from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Dunham article, I
estimated dementia rates five years before death. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, supra;Dunham, supra note 45, at 279 tbl.15.
51. This estimate assumes that these conditions are independent-they are not. See, e.g.,
Jane E. Brody, An Emotional Hair Trigger, Often Misread,N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2009, at D7
(reporting that 10% of borderline personality-disorder patients die by committing suicide). Recall
that the overall suicide rate in the United States is 1.3%. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, supra note 50. The conditions' lack of independence is another reason that the true
percentage of testate deaths involving the most common comorbid conditions must be lower than
0.45.
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must be vastly smaller. Many people who have mild dementia,52 an alcohol
problem, or an anxiety disorder, for example, are perfectly capable of
executing a will. Furthermore, wills are generally drafted by attorneys and
witnessed by at least two people. Gross cases of incapacity are unlikely to go
unnoticed by all of these participants.
Another way to get at testamentary incapacity is by analogy to other areas.
A great deal of research has been done on capacity to consent to medical
treatment, and that work "may be applicable to other complex capacities such
as testamentary capacity." 54 The levels of incapacity regarding medical
decisions observed among control groups range from 0 to 0.18, and are
generally less than 0.09.ss It is tempting to conclude that testamentary capacity
may be at similarly low levels. However, as the 0 to 0.18 range reflects,
capacity is task specific, so it is impossible to draw strong conclusions about
testamentary capacity from medical-capacity findings. Still, this research is
broadly suggestive that the true level of testamentary incapacity is quite low.
Another imperfect attempt to quantify testamentary incapacity looks at
studies of will contests and settlements. In one large study of wills, there were
will contests in 1%of cases and redistributions in 14%.56 Of course, there are
many reasons why parties would decline to file a meritorious will contest and
why settlement negotiations would break down. However, even if we assume
every contest and every redistribution was motivated by the testator's
incapacity, incapacit affected the distribution in, at most, only 15% of the
testate cases studied.
To examine whether a skew in the distribution affects the conclusion that the
clear-and-convincing standard dominates, assume a simple linear distribution,

52. See Fayaz Roked & Abdul Patel, Which Aspects of Cognitive Function Are Best
Associated with Testamentary Capacity in Patients with Alzheimer's Disease?, 23 INT'L J.
GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 552, 553 tbl. 1 (2008) (finding that 92.6% of Alzheimer's patients with
mild cognitive impairment and 51.9% of those with moderate cognitive impairment had
testamentary capacity).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.1 cmt.
o (2003) ("A will is validly executed if it is in writing and is signed by the testator and by a
specified number of attesting witnesses under procedures provided by applicable law."); cf
Jovanovi6 et al., supra note 49, at 490 (revealing that wills in a narrow study were primarily
holographic).
54. Shulman et al., supra note 49, at 64-65.

55. Dilip V. Jeste et al., Magnitude of Impairment in Decisional Capacity in People with
Schizophrenia Compared to Normal Subjects: An Overview, 32 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 121, 123
tbl.1, 126 (2005).
56. SUSSMAN ET AL., supranote 44, at 125, 184.
57. See id
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y = 1 - x. This distribution implies a 16.7% incapacity rate.58 The result is that
the clear-and-convincing standard remains superior if
Equation 3:

0.389 x G + 0.611 x B > I

In other words, the case for the heightened standard of proof becomes
stronger as the distribution is skewed toward capacity-that is, as the
likelihood of incapacity declines. This is consistent with the reasoning of some
courts. 59
Still, this result may be surprising to those familiar with the standard
statistical approach to selecting the optimal threshold of proof. According to
this approach, the optimal level of proof does not depend on the underlying
distribution. Rather, it is purely a function of the utilities of the four possible
outcomes. Specifically,
Equation 4:

1

P*=

UTP - UFN

60

+ 1

UTN - UFP
58.

075

1(1 - x) (I - x) dx
PTN =

0.389

x=0.5
0 75

1(1

- x) dx

x=-05

59. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. Toyota Motor Co., 467 F. Supp. 1142, 1173 (S.D. Ohio
1979) ("[I]f it is unlikely that a type of allegation can be supported, clear and convincing evidence
will be required to meet the burden of persuasion."), rev'd in part on other grounds, 667 F.2d 504
(6th Cir. 1981); see also 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, at 489 n.25 (suggesting

disapproval of this approach).
60. Cullison, supra note 6, at 569 eq.10b; DeKay, supra note 8, at 111 eq.17 (1996); John
Kaplan, Decision Theory and Reasonable Doubt, in COMMUNICATION SCIENCES AND THE LAW:
REFLECTIONS FROM THE JURIMETRICS CONFERENCE 251, 253 (Layman E. Allen & Mary E.

Caldwell eds., 1965).
Some wrongly accuse Professor Alan Cullison of failing to consider the utilities of
accurate results. Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the Virtues of

Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 107-08, 108 n.59 (2002) (criticizing Cullison's model for
not discussing the effects of utilities from accurate verdicts). Cullison, however, expressly
measures the costs of Type I and Type II errors relative to accurate results. Cullison, supra note
6, at 565-66.
Professor Laurence Tribe levels a more potent, yet still unpersuasive, attack on the
statistical approach and, by implication, the mathematical method of the present Article.
Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precisionand Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV.

L. REV. 1329, 1381-82 (1971). First, Tribe argues that the four utilities depend on the particular
case: "[T]he trier might justly regard as worse the erroneous conviction of a man to whose guilt
he had attached a probability [just above the decision standard] than the erroneous conviction of
one whose guilt had seemed to be virtually certain." Id. at 1382. That thought may accord with
human psychology, but it misses the point. The question is not how the trier evaluates utilities,
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Substituting 1 for UTN (G), 0.31 for UTp and Upp (I), and 0 for UrN (B)
generates an optimal proof standard of 0.69. By selecting the high estimate of
I and low boundary of B, 0.69 represents a low-end estimate.
If the optimal standard of proof is independent of the merits distribution,
why is the choice between the preponderance and clear-and-convincing
standards not similarly independent? The short answer is that the optimalstandard formula considers only changes at the margin, whereas a comparison
of the two standards requires calculating areas between them.61 This Article
has already demonstrated that skewing the distribution toward capacity makes
the clear-and-convincing standard relatively more appealing because of
increased accuracy. Alternative distributions that tilt the scale in favor of
preponderance are theoretically possible. Such a distribution would have to be
skewed toward incapacity in the 0.5 to 0.75 range. Common sense and the
data considered above, however, suggest that this skew is extremely unlikely.
The percentage of testators who are incapacitated is almost certainly less than
50%, and there is no reason to think that this leftward skew would somehow be
reversed in the 0.5 to 0.75 range.
In sum, the uniform-distribution assumption is likely false, but deviation in
the more likely direction-an incapacity rate less than 0.5-strengthens the
case for the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
B. Assumption 2: DistributionIs Independent of the Standardof Proof

The working answer assumes that the area under the total curve between 0.5
and 0.75 is not affected by the selected standard of proof. Economic theory
suggests that this assumption may be false. Use of the clear-and-convincing
but how society should. The strength of the case against him makes no difference to a falsely
convicted individual. More important for the purposes of this Article, testator intent is a more
objective and reliable yardstick than the swirl of competing values at stake in the criminal-justice
system. See infra text accompanying notes 92-95. Second, Tribe contends that the trier's
utilities will cloud her perceptions of the evidence. Tribe, supra, at 1383-84. As with the first
criticism, this is an argument against allowing the trier to set the standard of proof in each case,
not an argument against having one. Indeed, Tribe recognizes this and argues that the standard
should be set at the institutional level. Id. at 1384-85. But that does not satisfy Tribe. The
formula itself fails to account for variables that Tribe thinks are essential, including how many
false convictions and erroneous acquittals there are likely to be. See id. at 1385-86. This is
precisely why the statistical model is useful; it generates an answer without needing information
that is nearly impossible to gather. It can do so because it focuses on the marginal effects of each
type of outcome. See infra text accompanying note 61.
61. D.H. Kaye has argued that the standard statistical approach minimizes expected errors
rather than actual errors.

D.H. Kaye, Clarifying the Burden of Persuasion: What Bayesian

Decision Rules Do and Do Not Do, 3 INT'L J. EVID. & PROOF 1, 3, 10, 14 n.43 (1999). Kaye is
correct only if the expected merits distribution is symmetrical around the standard of proof, which
case selection theory would predict, see infra Part 111.1, but which is not necessarily true. Cf
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 224 (1992) ("It is critical to know not only the probability of Type I and

Type II error but also the severity of loss associated with each type.").
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standard would make wills more robust and, therefore, more attractive. As a
result, more people would execute wills, thus shifting the distribution up
throughout the range. But there is a countervailing effect: it is possible that the
greater security a will provides against incapacity, the more likely people
would be to delay executing a will until later in life. This is because the risk of
dementia would loom less large under the clear-and-convincing standard than
under the preponderance standard. 62 Theory cannot predict which of these two
effects would dominate. Nevertheless, it seems very unlikely that either effect
would be substantial; few people considering making a will know about the
standard of proof for incapacity in will contests. 63
Moving to a clear-and-convincing standard may also affect the amount of
evidence admitted in a testamentary incapacity case. This evidentiary effect
may be more potent than the effect on general will execution. The simple
model classifies individuals based on the admissible evidence of their
capacity.64 Raising the proof threshold will require contestants to produce
more evidence of incapacity, shifting the distribution rightward between 0.5
and 0.75. Because the incentive to produce evidence is strongest near the
decision standard, there likely would also be a skew toward incapacity. As
discussed above,65 this skew would favor the preponderance standard and, if
substantial enough, could tip the scale in that direction. But is such a
substantial skew likely?
The evidentiary effect assumes that will contestants under a preponderance
regime do not present as much evidence of incapacity as they could. 66 But
strategic and practical considerations weigh against this assumption. Setting
the burden of proof to one side, the preponderance standard has the reverse
effect on will proponents. Proponents need to produce more evidence to rebut

62. Cf Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, Efficient Awards and Standards of
Proof in Judicial Proceedings, 18 RAND J. ECON. 308, 314 (1987) (explaining that although
reducing the penalty for crime can increase accuracy, such a reduction may "encourage more
crimes to be committed").
63. However, many individuals execute multiple wills during their lifetimes and many rely
on family attorneys who have a long-term relationship with the testator. In either case, it is more
likely that the standard of proof will be taken into account in deciding when to execute a will.
Even if the distribution is more or less independent of the standard of proof, it may be
dependent on the low value of 1. The lack of congruence between the intestate distribution and
testator intent may operate as a penalty default, pushing individuals to make wills. Cf Ian Ayres
& Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (discussing penalty defaults and explaining that they "are designed to
give .. . an incentive to contract around the default rule").

64. See supra Part II.
65. See supra Part III.A.
66.

See Vern R. Walker, Preponderance, Probability and Warranted Factyinding, 62

BROOK. L. REv. 1075, 1114, 1114 n.98 (1996).
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a showing of incapacity. 67 The strategic contestant anticipates this and
responds by increasing her own evidentiary showing. In other words, as long
as the parties do not know the outcome in advance, both will have strong
incentives to produce a great deal of evidence under either proof standard. The
distribution ultimately rests on the evidence as a whole, not just the evidence
presented by the contestant.
Defendants in will contests cannot just sit on their hands for another reason:
they must be concerned with the possibility of being subject to judgment as a
Also, practically speaking, attorneys concerned about
matter of law.
malpractice liability who are paid either by the hour or on contingency, will be
highly motivated to root out most probative evidence. Still, the evidentiary
effect weighs in favor of the preponderance standard and cannot be wholly
discounted.
C. Assumption 3: Proofby a PreponderanceMeans Greaterthan 0.5
Likelihood; Clearand Convincing Means 0.75

The assumption that the preponderance standard equals 0.5 and the clearand-convincing standard equals 0.75 has both descriptive and normative
components. Descriptively, as reported above, a large survey of judges found
a mean, median, and mode of 0.75 for the clear-and-convincing-evidence
standard.7 0 This is strong evidence, but it obscures the fact that 65% of judges
picked a level other than 0.75 and that the responses, in general, ranged from
0.5 to I (see Figure 4).n

67. Cf id at 1115 ("If the decision value is set too high, then the party that does not have
the burden of persuasion may be more inclined to rest on the noncredibility of the proponent's
proofs, and less inclined to produce affirmative evidence.").
68. See Mike Redmayne, Standards ofProofin Civil Litigation, 62 MOD. L. REV. 167, 18182 (1999).
69. See Walker, supra note 66, at 1115 ("The three standards of proof employed in litigation
all help to create an incentive to produce more evidence than is sufficient to avoid suffering
judgment as a matter of law.").
70. McCauliff, supra note 40, at 1328-29, 1328 tbl.5. It should be noted that many courts
resist quantification. See, e.g., Mass. Inst. of Tech. v. Harman Int'l Indus., 584 F. Supp. 2d 297,
307 n.7 (D. Mass. 2008) (describing the clear-and-convincing standard as "vague and
impressionistic" (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 272 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting))); Lockard v. Carson, 287 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Iowa 1980) ("'[C]lear and satisfactory'
refers to the character or nature of the evidence, whereas 'preponderance' of the evidence is a
quantitative measure" (citing Hall v. Crow, 34 N.W.2d 195, 201 (Iowa 1948)).
71. See McCauliff,supra note 40, at 1328 tbl.5.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Judges' Percentages Associated with Clear-andConvincing Evidence 72
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Judges were much more consistent in describing preponderance as at or just
above 0.5-88% picked either 0.5 or 0.6.7 One problem with these numbers
is that juries, not judges, decide many will contests at the trial level.74 (Judges,
of course, decide motions and appeals, so their perception of the standard is
significant even in jury trials.) 75
Laypeople do not share judges' ideas regarding the preponderance standard.
One study reported that students' and jurors' means and medians hover around
0.75, not 0.5.7 This perception arguably translates into juror confusion, at
least when they must decide hypothetical cases. Studies have shown that the
standard of proof described in traditional legal terms-preponderance, clear
72. See id. (supplying the values upon which Figure 4 is based).
73. See id at 1331 & tbl.7. Whether judges actually apply the standards faithfully has been
questioned: "We doubt very much that an experienced trial judge is much bothered by
euphemisms such as clear and convincing or preponderance of the evidence." In re Estate of
Bennett, 865 P.2d 1062, 1067 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). But even the Bennett court stated that citing
the wrong standard would be reversible error. Id.
74. Eleven states and the District of Columbia do not permit jury trials in will contests.
Ross & REED, supra note 19, § 4:9, at 4-18 n.67.
75. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-54 (1986) (discussing the
judge's use of evidentiary standards of proof).
76. Rita James Simon & Linda Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof A View from the
Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW& Soc'Y REV. 319, 325 (1971).
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and convincing, or beyond a reasonable doubt-has only a slight effect on
plaintiffs' win rate. 77 Some of the same studies, however, demonstrate that
refraining the standards in numerical terms-51%, 71%, and 91%
confidence-eliminates the apparent confusion and causes plaintiffs' win rates
to decline as the standard of proof increases.7 8 In other words, the 0.5 and 0.75
probability levels may not accurately capture present-day reality (at least for
jurors and some judges), but numerical standards and appropriate jury
instructions could remedy that situation.79
The question, then, is: are such remedies normatively appealing? The
affirmative case is straightforward. It should be more difficult to deprive an
individual of his libertys than of his inheritance. 1 Thus, in some cases, the
costs of one type of error are much higher than the costs of the other. The
verbal formulations-beyond a reasonable doubt and clear-and-convincing
evidence-attempt to reflect these policy judgments, but, in practice, they do

77.

Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions ofStandards

ofProof,9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 164, 168 (1985) (finding greater variation in jury verdicts
with quantified, rather than qualitative, legal standards); James R. P. Ogloff, A Comparison of
Insanity Defense Standards on JurorDecision Making, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 509, 516, 519

(1991) (noting no deviance when comparing jury comprehension of criminal rules and standards
as applied to the insanity defense); see also id at 521 (reporting that only "51.6% of participants
identified the correct standard of proof'). Cf Murray Levine, Do Standards of ProofAffect
Decision Making in ChildProtectionInvestigations?,22 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 341, 344-45 tbl.1

(1998) (noting that "the legal definitions of standards of proof taken alone had no effect on the
rate of mock jurors' decisions for plaintiffs, but that quantified definitions of the standards of
proof did have an effect[]"); David U. Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A
Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 481 (1976) ("After seeing and hearing the video [standard
criminal]instructions, only 50 per cent of the instructed jurors understood that the defendant did
not have to present any evidence of his innocence, and that the state had to establish his guilt,
with evidence, beyond any reasonable doubt."). But see SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL

LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 31-32 (8th ed. 2007) ("Empirical studies confirm that jurors convict
more readily when instructed under a more-likely-than-not standard than when instructed under
the reasonable doubt standard . . . .").
78. Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 77, at 164-65.
79. More research is needed, but verbal instructions may suffice to achieve this goal. See,
e.g., Kagehiro & Stanton, supra note 77, at 173 ("Our results suggest that legal definitions may
have their intended effect on verdicts if they are presented in some form of comparative
context."); see also J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof Degrees of Belief 32 CALIF. L. REv. 242,

246-47 (1944) ("The only sound and defensible hypotheses are that the trier, or triers, of facts can
find what (a) probably has happened, or (b) what highly probably has happened, or (c) what
almost certainly has happened.").
80. This is applicable to Brooke Astor's son, Anthony Marshall. See Joseph A. Rosenberg,
Regrettably Unfair: Brook Astor and the Other Elderly in New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1004,

1048-49 (2010).
81. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("In cases involving individual
rights, whether criminal or civil, '[t]he standard of proof [at a minimum] reflects the value society
places on individual liberty."' (alteration in original) (quoting Tippett v. Maryland, 436 F.2d
1153, 1166 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
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not. The studies cited above show that people simply do not understand the
terms; the plaintiff win rate does not vary with the standard.
As a counterargument, some research suggests that people make
systematically better predictions in verbal terms than in numerical ones.82
Unlike the survey research described above, however, the cognitive
psychology literature on this subject does not examine jurors' ability to follow
instructions on hypothetical cases. Still, this is an important point; if jurors
think more accurately in words than in numbers, then the solution may be
better verbal formulations, not quantification, of standards of proof.
Perhaps the strongest argument against quantification 84 is that quantified
standards are insufficiently flexible; quantification prohibits the trier of fact
from balancing the costs of false positives and false negatives in a particular
1 Verbal
case and from adjusting the standard of proof accordingly.
would
not.
The
such
flexibility;
numerical
standards
instructions allow
studies showing no variance in jury decisions across legal standards perhaps
provide evidence that jurors, in fact, reason this way.87 Because only the legal
standard varied and the fact pattern remained the same, the implicit relative
costs of error were also constant across the studies. Thus, the lack of variation
in outcomes is consistent with case-by-case balancing.
82. Alf C. Zimmer, Verbal vs. Numerical Processing of Subjective Probabilities, in
DECISION MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 159, 180 (Roland W. Scholz ed., 1983).

83. See, e.g., id. at 163-64, 179-80 (providing survey research involving memory, collegeperformance predictions, and exchange-rate predictions).
84. For a persuasive response to a catalogue of other counter-arguments, see Dorothy K.
Kagehiro, Defining the Standard of Proofin Jury Instructions, 1 PSYCH. SCI. 194, 198 (1990),

and Peter Tillers & Jonathan Gottfried, Case Comment-United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp.
2d 275 (E.D.NY 2005): A Collateral Attack on the Legal Maxim that Proof Beyond a
Reasonable Doubt Is Unquantifiable?,5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 135, 141-51 (2006).

Professor Kevin Clermont argues that quantification would reduce accuracy because
hard variables mesh poorly with soft or unquantifiable variables, dehumanize legal procedure,
mask complexity with illusory precision, and fail to "accord with our ingrained way of thinking."
Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure'sMagical Number Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of

Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1147-48 (1987). None of these arguments is persuasive.
Hard and soft variables mesh equally poorly under the current system, but the problem is hidden
in ambiguity. If quantified standards can lead to better, more consistent results, then a little
"dehumanization" and change from ingrained ways of thinking are prices worth paying.
Numerical standards incorporating a modest range could mitigate the illusory precision concern.
See id at 1147; see also infra note 88 and accompanying text. Most importantly, Clermont's
premise that the present legal standards meaningfully convey information, Clermont, supra at
1148, is apparently false in light of the research findings reported above.
85. See, e.g., Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between
Precisionand Flexibility in Explaining "Beyond a Reasonable Doubt," 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y

& L. 769, 784 (2000) ("A single uniform standard across cases is not an optimal resolution when
the decisions to which the standard is being applied carry different costs.").
86. See Tillers & Gottfried, supra note 84, at 156. Again, clearer verbal standards are
another possible solution that might eliminate confusion and still retain some flexibility.
87. See sources cited supra note 77.
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One possible solution would be to permit quantified standards to be
expressed loosely or as a permissible range.88 For example, the-clear-andconvincing-evidence instruction could require confidence between 70% and
80%. This would effectively divide responsibility for setting the standard
between legislatures and appellate judges, on the one hand, and triers of fact,
on the other. As long as the standard was not too loose nor the range too wide,
such an approach would not substantially impact the analysis of this Article.
There are strong arguments against giving jurors too much flexibility in
setting the standard of proof. One pair of commentators puts the case for
quantified standards as follows: (1) triers of fact should not be permitted "to
strike a balance that is wildly at variance with the values of society at large";
(2) society's authorized lawmakers-legislators and appellate judges-should
select a standard of proof that best accommodates the competing interests; and
(3) "society can most effectively communicate to triers of fact" and enforce its
standards by using numbers.89 Moreover, under the flexible approach, if costs
are nonlinear, which is a justifiable presumption, "efficiency might require that
[the trial court] treat similarly situated defendants differently. "9 For example,
prison overcrowding could ratchet up the criminal standard of proof. 91
The case for relatively strict quantification is especially strong in capacity
will contests. Arguments for flexibility are generally directed toward the
criminal standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt.9 2 Two commentators
illustrate some of the policy tradeoffs in criminal cases:
Should society be willing to risk 10 guilty defendants going free
rather than one innocent person convicted? Or is the proper ratio 100
to one? Should we be willing to accept lower risks in a "spitting on
88. See James Franklin, United States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d 275 (E.D.N.Y 2005):
Quantificationofthe "ProofBeyondReasonableDoubt" Standard,5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK

159, 164-65 (2006) (advocating a quantitative description of "well above a probability of 0.8" for
the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard); Stoffelmayr & Diamond, supra note 85, at 782 ("An
alternative to the single probability standard for beyond a reasonable doubt might be to provide a
range (e.g., .87 to .92) that jurors would be invited to apply according to their assessments of the
costs of error associated with a particular offense."). Cf Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in
Probability:Burdens of Persuasion in a World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385

(1985) (arguing for a confidence-interval approach to quantifying standards of proof).
89. Tillers & Gottfried, supra note 84, at 155; see also Redmayne, supra note 68, at 183
(stating that the weighing of utilities is a policy decision "better made by the legislature than by
judges"). Cf Josef Athanas, Comment, The Pros and Cons ofJury Trials in Will Contests, 1990
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 529, 551 (arguing against jury trials in will contests, in part because "the
legislature should simply change the law rather than having juries misapply it").
90. Michael L. Davis, The Value of Truth and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Legal
Disputes, 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 343, 351 (1994).
91. See, e.g., id. (describing a hypothetical situation where a judge, knowing that the prison
is full and an additional inmate would increase costs, instructs a jury to be 99% certain of a
decision to convict).
92. See, e.g., Lillquist, supra note 60, at 87-89 (arguing for "a reasonable doubt standard
that . . . varies from case to case").
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the sidewalk" case than in a capital homicide case? In a bombterrorism case, should the risks be inverted with a preference for
convicting 10 innocents rather than letting one guilty go free? 93
Will contests for incapacity are less diverse and have a less direct impact on
nonparties. As shown above, the key variable in setting the standard of proof
is the probability that intestacy reflects testator intent if the will were deemed
invalid. Some evidence of incapacity may go to this question-that is, what
was the testator's intent when he told a person she would inherit, and then
disinherited her in his will?-but such evidence is not required. Moreover, the
jury will not have access to the aforementioned will studies and survey
research that estimate I in different situations. 94 In short, the case for
flexibility is much weaker in will contests than in criminal cases. The
countervailing advantage of consistency across cases and decision-makers
strongly favors strict quantification or, alternatively, relatively precise verbal
formulation. 95
D. Assumption 4: Courts Correctly Gauge ProbabilityofIncapacity

The vertical lines in Figures 1-3 imply that courts can accurately discern
even the smallest differences in the probability of incapacity. For example,
under the preponderance standard, every will executed by a testator with a 0.49
probability of incapacity is upheld, and every will executed by a testator with a
0.51 probability of incapacity is struck down. Although I am not the first to
make this simplifying assumption,9 6 it is obviously unrealistic. Review of
reversals in actual will contests that allege incapacity confirm the obvious. 97
How does error impact the choice of standards? The error rate, like parties'
uncertainty,98 is almost certainly highest around the decision standard.
Assume that juries can identify cases within 0.1 of the standard, but can do no
93. Jack B. Weinstein & Ian Dewsbury, Comment on the Meaning of "ProofBeyond a
Reasonable Doubt, " 5 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 167, 168-69 (2006).

Some have argued that quantifying the reasonable-doubt standard would make society's
acceptance of false convictions damagingly explicit. Tribe, supra note 60, at 1375. In light of the
publicity surrounding recent criminal exonerations, this worry seems almost quaint. Erik
Lillquist, Absolute Certainty and the Death Penalty, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 45, 90 (2005).

94. See Davis, supra note 90, at 350-51 ("If the marginal cost of error varies with the total
number of errors, a trial court that wished to set the optimal standard would need information
about facts not directly before it."). Two commentators recommend telling jurors about likely
criminal sentences in order to allow better weighing of costs in setting the standard of proof.
Stoffelmayr & Diamond, supra note 85, at 783.
95. See Redmayne, supra note 68, at 171 ("[C]an the right to consistent weighing of moral
harm be protected if the determination of the relevant utilities is left to each individual factfinder?").
96.

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.

LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 fig.1 (1984).
97. See, e.g., Paskvan v. Mesich, 455 P.2d 229, 231, 238-40 (Alaska 1969); Brown v.
Brown, 287 P.2d 913, 914, 917 (Okla. 1955).
98. See infra Part IlI.J.
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better than chance when deciding such cases. 99 Introducing this error profile
actually increases the percentage-point advantage of the clear-and-convincingevidence standard from 6.5 (Equation 2) to 9.6, assuming a uniform
distribution. 00 Thus, erroneous verdicts and judgments tilt the scale toward
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, but theory alone cannot determine
to what degree the scale tilts. Given that only a tiny fraction of cases are
litigated to judgment,'0 1 the effect of decision errors is almost certainly very
small.
E. Assumption 5: Wills Executed by Testators with CapacityAre Accurate

The assumption that wills executed by testators with capacity are accurate
appears twice in the model-once explicitly and once implicitly in the
estimates of I. The I values come from studies that compare the dispositive
schemes of probated wills with the pattern that would otherwise be imposed
through intestacy.102 Using the will as the gold standard assumes that it
accurately reflects testator intent-that is, G = 1.103 Commentators have
questioned this assumption, suggesting that "cultural standards"'1 04 or

99.

Data from two nonrepresentative samples suggest that the jury-verdict error rate is at

least 11-13%. Bruce D. Spencer, Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 305, 326 (2007).

100.

Computations on file with author; see supra fig. 2. One commentator has noted that
[u]nder any standard of proof, there will be a certain number of inaccurate
estimates of probability, wrongly placing the probability of the required fact on one
or the other side of the prescribed line. Some of the erroneous estimates of
probability under a clear and convincing standard-those that wrongly conclude
that the required fact is highly probable when in actuality it is merely more probable
than not-will now produce correct outcomes from the standpoint of truth. But the
number of outcomes that fit this description will be overshadowed by the number of
wrong outcomes that result from the skewed standard.

Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The Search for a
Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN. L. REV. 453, 463 n.47

(2002).
101. See infra Part III.J.
102.

See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 143 tbl.6-2; Dunham, supra note 45, at 251-52;

Schneider, supra note 43, at 424-25; Ward & Beuscher, supra note 46, at 413-14.
103. See infra Part Ill.E. Cf Stein & Fienstein, supra note 50, at 60-61, 61 tbl.2.1. In fact,
using the will as the gold standard goes farther and assumes that all wills, not just good wills,
accurately reflect a testator's intent. Obviously, wills infected by undue influence or testamentary
incapacity are almost certainly inconsistent with this assumption. However, although there is no
way to isolate good wills based on the studies, there is reason to think the vast majority of wills
are good.
104. Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Honor Thy Father and Mother?: How Intestacy Law Goes Too
Far in ProtectingParents, 37 SETON HALL L. REv. 171, 183 n.64 (2006) ("The drafters of wills

are subject to influences by lawyers and other advisors that may be motivated by cultural
standards, rather than an individual's actual desires.").
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"customary" 0 5 arrangements may trump a testator's true intent. Merely
because the unchallenged will is the gold standard by default does not mean it
perfectly reflects what a testator wants.
One way to test whether wills generally match testator intent is to compare
preferences in wills with preferences expressed elsewhere. In one study of
wills, 85.8% of decedents gave everything to their surviving spouse when also
survived by lineal kin.106 By comparison, a second study reports that 70.8% of
survey respondents said they would leave everything to their spouses if their
mothers were the only other survivors.'o7 However, when survived by a
spouse and children, the percentage of survey respondents giving the entire
estate to the spouse dropped to between 51.6% and 58.3%, depending on the
age of the children.1os In one sense, these broadly consistent results are
reassuring; majorities in will studies and telephone surveys alike favor the
surviving spouse over all other kin. The direction of the difference suggests
that culture and custom are not more powerful in influencing a will than a
survey response. The intestacy statute reflects society's judgment about how
an estate should be distributed, generally forcing the surviving spouse to share
with lineal kin. 0 9 That people deviate farther from that judgment in their wills
than in surveys supports the view that wills are not often driven by culture and
custom.
To culture and custom, mistake also must be considered as a source of
deviation from testator intent. A classic example is Mahoney v. Granger, in
which the testator instructed her lawyer that she wanted her twenty-five
cousins to share her estate equally." 0 Apparently not realizing that the testator
also had a living aunt, the lawyer drafted a residuary clause in favor of the
105.

Mary Louise Fellows, An EmpiricalStudy of the Illinois Statutory Estate Plan, 1976 U.

ILL. L. F. 717, 722 (1976) [hereinafter Fellows, Empirical Study] ('The attorney who typically
drafts the will may have influenced the testate's distributive pattern by suggesting that certain will
provisions are customary.").
106.

SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 89 tbl.5-1 (studying the preferences of those persons

with wills in Ohio).
107. Mary Louise Fellows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distributionat Death and
Intestate Succession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 321, 351 tbl.7
(1928). The Sussman study exclusively involved Ohio wills. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at

36. Fellows's survey included Ohio and studied four additional states. See Fellows et al., supra,
at 352 tbl.8 (showing results for Ohio as well as Alabama, California, Massachusetts, and Texas).
The Ohio respondents in Fellows's study were particularly generous to their surviving spouses82.8% gave their spouses the entire estate, id, a figure consistent with Sussman's findings. See
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 89.

108. Fellows et al., supra note 107, at 358, 359 tbls.1 I & 12. Again, Ohioans were the most
generous to their spouses. See id.at 361 tbls.13 & 14.
109. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage:Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH
L. REV. 1227, 1263-69 (2005) (discussing estate distribution when there is a surviving spouse
and surviving children); Scalise, supra note 104, at 177-80 (discussing the two general
approaches used to determine a decedent's parents' share when there is a surviving spouse).
I10. Mahoney v. Granger, 186 N.E. 86, 86-87 (Mass. 1933).
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testator's "heirs at law."'"1 1 Because the aunt was the only "heir[] at law" under
Massachusetts law, the cousins took nothing, despite the testator's clear
statement that she wanted them to inherit.l12 There is a modem trend to correct
such errors, but the majority of jurisdictions still follow the traditional rules
barring extrinsic evidence and reformation.113
By how much would good wills have to deviate from perfection in order to
favor the preponderance standard? Using the uniform distribution, G would
have to be less than 0.827.114 In other words, a will executed by a person with
capacity and free of any other defects would have to reflect the testator's intent
less than 82.7% of the time in order to tip the scale toward the preponderance
standard. Custom and culture may be powerful and mistakes numerous, but it
is hard to believe they introduce at least a 17.3% error rate into wills.' 15
F. Assumption 6: Will Studies Show How Well Intestacy Matches Testator
Intent

The estimate of I as less than or equal to 0.31 derives from studies of wills
probated in 1982 and earlier." 6 Obviously, much has changed since 1982, but
three potential sources of error stand out: (1) changes in intestacy law; (2)
changes in family structure and hence survivorship; and (3) changes in testator
preferences.
By far the biggest reason for the disparity between testator preference and
intestacy is that testators usually want their surviving spouses to take the entire
estate, whereas intestacy statutes often divide the estate. 17 For example, in
one study of wills, 86% of testators devised the entire estate to their surviving
spouses when they were also survived by lineal kin, generally parents or
children; the intestacy statute divided the estate.118 After studies and survey
research on wills pointed out this incongruity,11 9 some states modified their
intestacy statutes to give surviving spouses a larger share. 120 This would tend

111.
112.

Id. at 86.
Id at 87.

113.

JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 335-36, 352 (8th ed. 2009).

114. Using they = 1 -x distribution, G would be less than 79.7%.
115. One could argue that these are not errors at all. The lawyer who convinces a testator to
dispose of property in a way different than the testator originally requested most likely acts in
good faith. The testator's changed mind may reflect his new intent and is not necessarily a
custom-induced error.
116. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44; Dunham, supra note 45, at 252 n.20; Schneider, supra
note 43, at 412 (indicating wills examined were probated before 1982); Ward & Beuscher, supra
note 46, at 414 tbl.10.
117. See SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 89; Fellows, supra note 107, at 350-51.
118. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 89.
119. See, e.g., Fellows, supra note 107, at 348, 354.
120. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 2
n.8 (2000).
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to raise I, but a clear majority of states still require that the estate be split. 21 In
most of the country, therefore, it does not appear that intestacy statutes have
substantially improved in advancing the intent of most decedents regarding
122
surviving- spouses.
The case of the surviving spouse may still be problematic, but perhaps there
are fewer surviving spouses due to increasing divorce rates. The total
percentage of married Americans declined from 67% in 1950, to 54% in
2008,123 but the percentage of married persons aged 65 and older actually
increased from 55% in 1980 to 58% in 2007.124 Notably, persons aged sixtyfive years and older account for approximately 73% of deaths annually.125 Of
course, with divorce more common today, many older, married adults may be
in second marriages. Survey research suggests that individuals with a
surviving spouse and child from a previous marriage favor splitting the estate
between them.126 Twenty-nine states "give the surviving spouse a reduced
share if she is not the other parent of the deceased spouse's children." l27 The
prevalence of second marriages and the accuracy of modem intestacy statutes
in matching testator intent in such circumstances are values that would need to
be known before updating estimates of L.128
Notably, the same demographic change also exerts force in the
opposite direction.
Remarriage often creates stepchild and stepparent
relationships. It has been estimated that "one out of every three Americans is a

121. See Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1266 ("In ... thirty-four states, the surviving spouse
never receives the deceased spouse's entire estate in any situation where the deceased spouse left
children, even if the surviving spouse is the other parent of those children.").
122. At least in cases where there are no children from a previous marriage. See infra text
accompanying note 126.
123.

RACE:

MS-1. MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD ANDOVER, BY SEX AND

1950 TO PRESENT,

http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/msl.xls

(last

visited Oct. 2, 2010).
124.

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, 37

tbl.33 (2009); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, 42

tbl.40 (2000).
125.

Melonie Heron et al., Deaths: FinalDatafor 2006, 57 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REPS. 1, 20,

22 tbl.3, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/nvsr57 14.pdf.
126. Fellows et al., supra note 107, at 366 tbl.18 (reporting that 23% of respondents wanted
their spouses to take their entire estate; 29% wanted their spouses to take between 51-99%; 37%
wanted an equal split between their spouses and children; and 11% wanted their spouses to take
less than 50%).
127. Rosenbury, supra note 109, at 1268.
128. Note that, assuming a uniform distribution, if I > 0.375, that would not necessarily tilt
the scale in favor of the preponderance standard. One would need to know B, the probability of a
bad will reflecting intent.
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Intestacy law generally excludes step
member of a stepfamily."l 29
relationships;' 30 some argue that this thwarts the intent of many stepparents.'31
Other demographic changes similarly depress the value of I. For example,
"[a]pproximately 7% of the nation's couples are in unmarried committed
relationships, including roughly 1.7 million gay and lesbian couples."l 32 This
is consistent with the overall marital-status numbers reported above. Because
same-sex couples are permitted to marry in only a handful of states, intestacy
law's exclusion of unmarried partners raises discrimination concerns as
well.1 33 Unmarried, committed partners overwhelmingly prefer that the
surviving partner share in the estate,' 34 but prevailing intestacy laws give
unmarried partners nothing.' 35
A final concern with relying on relatively old research findings is that
people's dispositive preferences may have changed over time. Short of
undertaking a new study, there is little to say in response to this concern.
However, given the observed stability of I across studies from diverse areas
over a forty-seven-year period,136 perhaps the burden should be on the
proponent of change to offer a persuasive theory for why preferences would
have changed in the direction of intestacy statutes.

129.

Gary, supra note 120, at 29-30.

130.

RALPH C. BRASHIER, INHERITANCE LAW AND THE EVOLVING FAMILY 156-57 (2004)

("On the whole, the instances in which stepchildren inherit from an intestate stepparent are

negligible.").
131. Id. at 157 ("The sweeping but easily administered objective rule that denies stepchildren
an intestate share under the laws of most states undoubtedly is at odds with the wishes of many

stepparents who die intestate.").
132. Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planningfor Unmarried
Committed Partners:EmpiricalLessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach, 41 ARIZ. L.
REv. 417, 418 (1999); see also BRASHIER, supra note 130, at 2 (arguing that census numbers are
"probably underrepresentative because some unmarried cohabitants are reluctant to identify

themselves as such and because the number excludes unmarried couples who reside in a
household headed by someone else"); JASON FIELDS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA'S
FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2003 16, Current Population Reports, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce (Nov. 2004) ("The proportion of all households that were unmarried-partner
households [opposite-sex only] has been steadily increasing, from 2.9 percent of all households in
1996 to 4.2 percent in 2003.").
133. See, e.g., Robbennolt & Johnson, supra note 132, at 419 (acknowledging that the
passage of the Defense of Marriage Act "allows states to refuse to reconcile same-sex marriages
authorized in other states").
134. Mary Louise Fellows, Committed Partners and Inheritance:An Empirical Study, 16 L.
& INEQ. 1, 38, 47, 50 (1998); accord Robbennolt & Johnson, supra note 132, at 441.
135. Fellows, supra note 134, at 38, 47.
136. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 84; Dunham, supra note 45, at 252 tbl.9; Schneider,
supra note 43, at 425.
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G. Assumption 7: Intestacy Is the FallbackPosition

Not every successful will contest results in the estate being divided
according to the intestacy statute.137 Sometimes the court gives effect to a
prior will.138 The Brooke Astor case described above illustrates this point.13
There, the state alleged, inter alia, that Astor's son wrongfully induced her to
execute a codicil giving him her residuary estate, which was to go to charity
under her prior will.140 The question, then, is: what is the effect of a prior will
on the standard-of-proof question?
The accuracy of intestacy does not depend on testator capacity; the
likelihood that a prior will accurately reflects testator intent does. If the
testator had capacity when he executed a codicil or a new will, then the old
will almost necessarily fails to reflect intent (UFP = 0). If, on the other hand,

the testator lacked capacity, then there would seem to be a very high
probability that the prior will properly reflected the testator's intent (UTP Plugging these values into Equation 3 and assuming a uniform
P).141
distribution, the clear-and-convincing standard of proof prevails only if
B > P - 0.6. 14 This seems unlikely given the expectation that B is very close
to 0 and P to be very close to 1. Jurisdictions that currently require clear-andconvincing evidence of incapacity should consider requiring only a
preponderance when evaluating a codicil or replacement will.

137. 96 C.J.S. Wills § 862 (2001) (stating that courts make a presumption against intestacy
and favor effectuating the testator's true intent).
138. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 39 ("A prior will executed by a testator who was admittedly of sound
mind is admissible on the theory that such a will tends to show the fixed and settled purpose of
the testator."); see, e.g, In re Brink's Estate, 161 N.W.2d 438, 440 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (holding
that a testator's prior will "was material and admissible evidence on the issues of mental
incompetency and undue influence"); In re Bailess's Estate, 569 P.2d 543, 545 (Okla. Civ. App.
1977) (holding that prior will could be considered in deciding whether a testator lacked capacity
when executing a subsequent will); Bums v. Kabboul, 595 A.2d 1153, 1162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(explaining that a previously executed, valid will "tends to show the fixed and settled purpose of
the testator, and any sudden change in such purpose without adequate cause may be evidence
from which an unsound mind may be inferred").
139.

See Eligon, Astor Trial, supra note 13, at A25.

140. People v. Marshall, Indictment No. 6044-07, slip op. at 6-7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 29,
2010), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/brookeastor/nymrshll I107ind.html.
141. See Sherwin, supra note 100, at 463 n.49 ("[A]n informal document offered as a will
often reflects a disposition that the testator at least considered, even if the disposition was
ultimately rejected.").
142. Skewing the distribution to the left (toward capacity) favors the clear-and-convincing
standard, but it is probably not enough to change the bottom line. Applying the y = I - x
distribution, the clear-and-convincing standard dominates if B > P - 0.64, which still seems very
unlikely.
143. Cf Stoffelmayr & Diamond, supra note 85, at 782 (suggesting that "a legislature might
set different quantitative [proof| levels for different offenses").
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H. Assumption 8: Promoting Testator Intent Is Dichotomous

A closely related assumption for all three parameters (G, B, and 1) is that a
distribution either matches testator intent perfectly (equal to 1) or it utterly fails
(equal to 0). Of course, some distributions would be more offensive to a
testator than others. The intestacy statute may attempt to achieve distributions
that are least offensive to most eople rather than to achieve perfect results in
the maximum number of cases.
Failing to award partial credit, as it were,
may be a heavy thumb on the scale against intestacy and, therefore, in favor of
the clear-and-convincing standard.
The case against partial credit relies on formalism and realism. Formally, a
distribution either is or is not what the testator wanted. A solution that gets it
only partially right is not what the testator wanted. The argument from realism
is based on the difficulty in awarding partial credit. Assume the testator
wanted to give everything to his surviving spouse, but the intestacy statute
awards only half to his spouse and the rest to his children. Does this advance
the testator's intent by 0.5, or by more or less than 0.5? Would it matter if the
testator were estranged from his children? Even this simple case illustrates
that non-arbitrary intermediate values would be difficult to estimate.
Note, too, that the net effect of relaxing the assumption is ambiguous in
theory. No doubt the value of I would go up, but so too would the value of B.
Even wills executed by a testator without capacity probably include some
provisions that are not wholly objectionable. For example, the codicil in the
Brooke Astor case changed the residuary clause but left the rest of the original
will intact.145 Which effect dominates? To tip the scale in favor of
preponderance (assuming a uniform distribution), the change in I (A]) would
have to be greater than 0.065 + 0.625 x AB. Using one will study, 146 for
example, if the intestate estate-splitting arrangement advanced the intent of
testators who were survived by spouses and lineal kin and who willed
everything to their spouses by 0.5, the value of I would rise by 0.22, from 0.31
to 0.53. B would have to rise by 0.25 in order to outweigh I's increase and
save the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. It seems unlikely that
incapacitated testators are on average 25% satisfied with their wills. Then
again, to assume that all testators who will everything to their spouses give
50% approval to splitting is probably an overestimate. If one, instead, assumes
that only half of such testators gives 50% partial credit and the remaining half
gives 0, then I would increase by 0.11 and B would need to rise by only 0.07
for the clear-and-convincing standard to prevail. Data are needed to resolve
the question, but awarding partial credit has the potential to flip the result.

144.

See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REv. 21,

29 (1994) ("No intestacy regime can hope to be 'suitable' for every person who dies intestate.").
145. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
146.

SUSSMAN ETAL., supra note 44, at 86, 89.

2010]

The General Theory of Standardsof Proof

31

I. Assumption 9: Promoting Testator Intent Is and ShouldBe the Only
Objective of the CapacityRequirement

It has been suggested that the mental-capacity requirement does not promote
testamentary freedom at all.1 47 Thomas Atkinson, in a classic wills handbook,
argued that eliminating the mental-capacity requirement "would be carrying
the conception of freedom of testation to its fullest extent." 48 In a different
context, I argued against this type of reasoning.149 In fairness to Atkinson, a
subsequent edition adds the correct statement that "an attitude of consent is
essential and this presupposes some degree of mental capacity."' 50
It is now widely accepted that promoting testator intent is at least one goal of
the capacity requirement. 151 Other goals include: (1) protecting the family, (2)
protecting an incompetent man or woman as he or she is not considered a
"person," (3) preserving an appearance of legitimacy, (4) protecting the sane
testator who later loses capacity, (5) protecting society from irrational acts, and
(6) protecting vulnerable testators from exploitation.152 The "personhood" line
of argument appears to devolve into testator intent; it is the inability to
formulate intent, to reason, that deprives the insane of personhood.153
Similarly, the fourth and sixth reasons are specific manifestations of the
concern for testator intent-we protect the will of a sane testator because we
think the will reflects testator intent, and we worry about exploitation because
we fear it might overcome a vulnerable person's intent.154 The third and fifth
reasons both address externalities; neither seems as important as what happens
to the interested parties, namely the testator and the family. 55
When the testator's and his family's interests conflict, who wins? The
general answer in the law of wills is that the testator wins.1 56 If there is a valid
147. ATKINSON, supra note 19, § 78, at 186.
148. Id, § 77, at 186; see also George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, From Contract to
Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 537 passim (1973) (making a similar argument
for contracts).
149. See Fredrick E. Vars, Illusory Consent: When an Incapacitated Patient Agrees to
Treatment, 87 OR. L. REv. 353, 355 (2008) ("Assent without capacity is not an expression of
autonomy; it is at best an illusion of autonomy.").
150. ATKINSON, supra note 19, § 26, at 186.
151. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 113, at 167; Mary Louise Fellows, In Search of
Donative Intent, 73 IOWA L. REV. 611, 621 (1988).
152. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 113, at 166-68.
153. Cf Bailey H. Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the
Marketplace, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 925 (1990) ("Autonomous choices entail knowledge
(information and foreseeability) and capability (reason and sense).").
154. DUKEMINIER ETAL., supra note 113, at 167.
155. See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of Testamentary
Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 53-55 (2006) (describing the need to balance the tension between
testator protection and family protection).
156. See id. at 55 ("As important as the family preference is, it takes second place to the
overriding policy of wills law, which is effectuating the testator's intent."); see also id at 54
("[TJhe family's interest, in all cases, derives from the testator's presumed intention to benefit
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will, it controls subject to very few exceptions.' 5 7 This is not quite the right
question, however, when the issue is setting the standard of proof for an
incapacity contest. Instead, one needs to ask what influence, if any, family
protection should have on the values of G, B, and I. The relative weight of G
and B would seem independent of family concerns; a will should be enforced
regardless of whether it contains provisions for family. That leaves I. One
goal of intestacy is clearly family protection. 158 The question then becomes:
should I, as a result, be assigned a value higher than its percentage
correspondence with testator intent?
Some have argued that family protection is the primary goal of the capacity
requirement,159 but that seems plainly wrong. Despite suggestions to the
contrary,160 the capacity doctrine is not an open-ended invitation for juries to
strike down dispositions that do not adequately provide for the testator's
Favoring intestacy over testacy in this way would be a blunt
family.'
instrument to protect the family.162 The law could protect family more directly
with an elective share for spouses, forced heirship for issue, or a family
maintenance system like those of England and Canada.' 63 These schemes
would represent express policy judgments that certain dispositive schemes

them."). But see Jeffrey M. Alden, Testamentary Capacity in a Nutshell: A Psychiatric
Reevaluation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1119, 1123-24 (1966) ("[T]he primary purpose of testamentary
capacity ... is the protection of the family.").
157. See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 102 (1998 & Supp.
2010) (providing an example of an exception to the general rule that a valid will controls the
elective share of a surviving spouse).
158. Milton D. Green, Public Policies Underlying the Law of Mental Incompetency, 38
MICH. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (1940) ("[Plrotection of the family lay at the root of the statutes of
descents and distributions.").
159. Id at 1218-19.
160. See Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major
Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 298-302 (1944) (discussing the "unnaturalness" of a testator's
disinheriting his family and courts' responses to such).
161. Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 307, 365-66 (1988-89). Fairly applied, the capacity doctrine could strike down a will that
gives the bulk of an estate to family (e.g., Brooke Astor's son) in favor of a prior will that gave
the lion's share to charity.
162. See Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1043, 1051 (1987) ("If family protection is sought, obviously better ways exist to achieve
it.").

163. See Ronald Chester, Should American Children Be ProtectedAgainst Disinheritance?,
32 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 405, 408, 414-18 (1997) (advocating adoption of the British
Columbia family maintenance system). Louisiana promotes testator intent through a high
incapacity standard, and family protection through forced heirship. LA. CONST., art. XII, §5; LA.
Civ. CODE. ANN. art. 1477 (2000).
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should not be allowed. Most important, they leave intact a testator's other
dispositive wishes, unlike a finding of incapacity. 16 4
In sum, advancing testator intent is the only legitimate goal of the capacity
requirement.
J. Assumption 10: Every Case Is Litigatedto Judgment

By applying the decision rule to every testator, the working answer
implicitly assumes that all cases are litigated to judgment and hence subjected
to the rule. That, however, is not true. About 1% of testate cases involve will
contests,165 although a high fraction of those contain an allegation of
testamentary incapacity.166 Hence, the overwhelming majority of wills are
either enforced as written or informally revised through settlement by
interested parties.
1. Only Uncertain Cases Are Litigated

A leading model posits that uncertainty over the outcome of a will contest
drives litigation.167 Uncertainty is greatest around the decision standard;
accordingly, that is where the bulk of litigated cases should be.168 To take an
extreme case, assume that incapacity will contests are litigated to judgment
only when the testator's likelihood of incapacity is within 0.1 of the decision
standard (and all such cases are in fact litigated to judgment). Assume, further,
that all wills outside that range are implemented without contest. How does
each standard of proof advance testator intent? The clear-and-convincingevidence standard is superior so long as G > B, which is almost certainly

164.

See Baron, supra note 162, at 1051 ("[R]egulatory effects of holding a testator

incompetent on mental incapacity grounds are considerably more draconian than the explicit
regulations set forth in elective share statutes and the like.").
165. SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 184 (reporting that, in Ohio, 6 out of 453, or 1.32%,
of testate cases involved will contests); Jeffrey P. Rosenfeld, Will Contests: Legacies of Aging
and Social Change, in INHERITANCE AND WEALTH IN AMERICA 173, 185 tbl.8.3 (Robert K.

Miller, Jr. & Stephen J. McNamee, eds., 1998) (finding that 90 out of 7817 probates, or about
1.14%, were contested); Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 613 chart 3 (1987) (noting that 66 out of 7638, or 0.86%, of filed wills
were contested). Will-contest rates were historically higher in some jurisdictions. See Kristine S.
Knaplund, The Evolution of Women's Rights in Inheritance, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 3, 30 &
n. 183 (2008) (providing data that indicates will contests ranged from 1% to 8.89%).
166. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 648 chart 22 (finding allegations of testamentary
capacity in forty-eight out of sixty-six, or 73%, of will contests).
167. Priest & Klein, supra note 96, at 7-9; see Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement
of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 443
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) (describing divergent-party expectations as "the most influential

account of why cases may fail to settle").
168.

Priest & Klein, supra note 96, at 20 ("According to the model, given some error in the

parties' estimates of Y, an interval will exist around the decision standard which will contain
some large fraction of the set of litigated disputes.").
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true. 169 Thus, settlement in accord with the most accepted model strengthens
the case for the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.
Professor Emily Sherwin has suggested in another context that greater
ambiguity about the meaning of the clear-and-convincing standard would lead
to less settlement and more litigation. 170 This is an excellent theoretical point,
but it ignores the underlying distribution and the possibility of more precise
jury instructions. First, as explained above,17 1 there is good reason to think the
merits distribution is skewed toward capacity. This means that fewer cases are
near the clear-and-convincing standard than are near the preponderance
standard. Therefore, even if a higher percentage of cases that are close to the
heightened proof threshold (clear and convincing) fail to settle, the overall
settlement rate might increase. Second, and more importantly, even with a
uniform distribution, quantifying the clear-and-convincing standard of proofl72
could reduce uncertainty and thereby facilitate settlement.
2. Settlement Replicates Trial Outcomes

The standard model of litigation assumes that a plaintiff will sue when the
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs. 173 Expected benefits include
the probability of prevailing multiplied by the expected amount of an award.
Because litigation costs money, if the parties accurately assess trial prospects
That is
there are almost always gains to be achieved through settlement.
why the case selection model above is premised on the notion that parties
cannot foresee trial outcomes with perfect accuracy. We assumed above a
zone of uncertainty of plus or minus 0.1. Below that threshold, no will contest
should ever succeed; above that threshold, the proponent of the will should
always agree to a settlement favoring the contestant. 175 If that happens, the
working answer holds, even though only a fraction of cases are litigated.
Economic theory predicts that settlements will replicate trial outcomes if
"(1) the plaintiff and the defendant have the same expectations about the trial,
and (2) the plaintiff and defendant bear the same transaction costs to resolve

169. This result corresponds to a uniform distribution. Note that the dominance of the clearand-convincing-evidence standard is even stronger with a leftward skew, or y = 1 - x.
170. Sherwin, supra note 100, at 470-73; see also supra Part III.C.
171. See supra Part III.A.
172. See supraPart 11I.C.
173. Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and
Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075-76 (1989).

174. Hay & Spier, supra note 167, at 442; see infra text accompanying note 186 (referring to
"strategic litigation"). I argue that there are almost always gains to be achieved through
settlement because, for example, a party may value trial as an opportunity for self-expression or
publicity.
175.

See Hay & Spier, supra note 167, at 445 ("As an initial approximation, .

. .

we might

anticipate that cases will generally settle for an amount roughly equal to the expected judgment at
trial.").
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the dispute."1 76 The second condition will not be satisfied with respect to
many will contests. The costs of defending a will contest are generally borne
by the estate.177 This means that an interested beneficiary, if successful in the
will contest, may pay only a portion of the costs of litigation. Moreover, the
unsuccessful will beneficiary pays nothing out of pocket.178 Therefore, the
beneficiary is likely to be more aggressive and successful in settlement
negotiations than at trial.' 79 But the beneficiary is not the one who controls the
litigation in such cases, unless he is also the executor.' 8 The executor may
have less incentive to aggressively defend the will, which would tend to tilt the
scales back toward pro-plaintiff settlements.' 81 This may explain why some
beneficiaries choose to intervene in will contests.182
Accordingly, the estate paying the costs of will contests causes settlements
more often to favor will proponents. How, then, does this affect the selection
of the standard of proof? In effect, it elevates the effective standard in
settlement. For example, the decision rule at trial may be 0.50, but only
contestants with cases above 0.60 will succeed in settlement. Because the vast
majority of cases are not litigated to judgment,ls3 the simple answer's analysis
should be applied to the settlement threshold, not to the litigation threshold.
Depending upon its magnitude, this effect could flip the answer. The
presumptive optimal threshold, again, is 0.69. Shifting the standard upward
176. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMIcs 445 (5th ed. 2008); see also
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class

Actions, 43 STAN. L. REv. 497, 499 (1991) ("Moreover, the available theoretical models of
settlement behavior predict or imply that settlement outcomes will approximate trial outcomes.").
177. Diane J. Klein, A Disappointed Yankee in Connecticut (or Nearby) Probate Court:
Tortious State Approaches in the First,Second, and Third Circuits, 66 U. PITr L. REv. 235, 238

& n.4 (2004) ("Generally, the estate bears the cost of defending the proffered will."); see, e.g.,
TEX. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 243 (West 2003) (providing that "necessary expenses and
disbursements" relevant to probate come from the estate).
178.

Edmund Nathaniel Cahn, Undue Influence and Captation:A Comparative Study, 8 TUL.

L. REv. 507, 517 (1934) ("Estates are consumed with fees and expenses, costs being but rarely
imposed upon unsuccessful contestants."); John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The
ConservatorshipModel, 77 MICH. L. REv. 63, 65 (1978) (explaining that estates bear the costs of
will contests, thus "failing to charge a losing plaintiff with attorney fees and other costs incurred
by the defendant").
179.

See Cahn, supra note 178, at 519.

180. See ATKINSON, supra note 19, at 579 (noting that a temporary administrator may be
appointed pending a trial, which demonstrates that the beneficiary is not in charge of the
litigation).
181. See id (indicating that courts have authority to replace executors if they are unduly
hostile to the estate or if charged with undue influence in administering the estate).
182. See In re Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Wyo. 1988) (noting that the sole
beneficiary is allowed to intervene in will contests). But see Estate of Peery v. Swafford, No.
03A01-9803-CV-00087, 1998 WL 744109, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 1998) (rejecting
beneficiary's motion for intervention because it was untimely and because his interests were
adequately represented by the proponents of the will).
183. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 613 chart 3.
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moves the preponderance threshold closer to, and the clear-and-convincing
standard farther from, the optimum threshold.
Even where the assumptions hold, empirical evidence has called into
question the prediction of economic theory that settlements will approximate
trial outcomes. 1 84 One analysis of data collected from securities class-action
suits concluded that the merits did not affect settlements, citing an agenc
problem akin to the one discussed above, along with a host of other factors.
The researcher speculated that a similar disconnect might be found in
"strategic litigation, where the ultimate outcome of the litigation is not its real
86
object but the mere filing of a lawsuit achieves the litigant's objective."l
Will contests do not seem a likely candidate for strategic litigation.
Something other than money, however, plainly motivates will contestants.
One researcher concludes that "there is no correlation between size of the
estate and the likelihood of contest." 87 That will contestants are deviating
from the economic model in this respect poses the question of whether they
are also indifferent to the merits. That seems unlikely. A failed will contest
would seem to vindicate non-monetary interests-such as fairness, respect,
etc.-little more than monetary ones. Settlements, however, can deviate from
the merits for other reasons.
3. Will Contests May Be Nuisance Suits

Economic theory has developed an explanation for settlements in weak
cases-a further divergence from the view that settlements replicate trial
outcomes. 189 Economic theory posits that it is costly for defendants to assess
the merits of a plaintiffs case. o It would seem less costly the farther away
one is from the standard of proof. This suggests that the clear-and-convincing
standard would reduce will contests filed for nuisance purposes because the
distribution is quite probably skewed toward capacity. Few weak suits are
close enough to the standard of proof to masquerade as strong ones. But is this
effect important?

184. See Alexander, supra note 176, at 499-500.
185. Id. at 597.
186. Id.
187. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 617; accordRosenfeld, supra note 165, at 185 tbl.8.3.
188. Hay & Spier, supra note 167, at 444 ("[T]he likelihood of settlement decreases as the
amount at stake in the case increases."). The asymmetric cost effect described supra, text
accompanying note 186, is mitigated to the extent the parties are motivated by factors other than
money.
189. E.g., Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10
INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3 (1990).
190.

Id at 4.
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One commentator has asserted that "[a] great percentage of will contests are
merely for nuisance value."191 But one study of sixty-six filed will contests
found that 24 of those contests (approximately 36%) settled out of court.192
This settlement rate is substantially lower than general civil litigation,' 9 3
suggesting relatively few nuisance suits.1 94 Perhaps more probative is the fact
that "the contestant rarely obtained less than a substantial portion of the
estate."' 95 To be sure, large settlement amounts are not inconsistent with the
economic theory of nuisance suits, 196 but settlements for small amounts are
more likely to be indicative of nuisance motives.197 Fourteen additional will
contests (21%) were either voluntarily terminated or dismissed,198 which may
represent unsuccessful nuisance suits. The remaining twenty-eight cases
(42%) were either fully adjudicated or were still pending at the time of the
study.199 Seventeen out of the twenty-five adjudicated cases (68%) were
decided in favor of the proponent.200 Without an independent measure of the
merits of settled and dismissed cases, it is impossible to know how common
nuisance will contests are, but the data do not seem to indicate an unusually

191. Walter T. Burke, Avoiding Pitfalls When Counseling the Elderly, 15 No. 2 COMPLEAT
LAW. 13, 18 (1998).

192.

Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 619-20.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.4, at 597 (7th ed. 2007)
("[O]nly 4 percent of all civil cases in state courts are tried."); Hay & Spier, supra note 167, at
442 ("Offiled lawsuits in America, over 90 percent settle before trial .... ).
194. Alternative interpretations are possible. See, e.g., Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the
193.

Shadow: The Unseen Hand of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 177-82

(2002) (arguing that will contests are less likely to settle because the testator is dead, the testator's
intent is malleable, the doctrine has moral dimension, and the remedy is all-or-nothing).
195. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 621.
196. See Katz, supra note 189, at 4 (explaining that, though a defendant may "realize that a
claim is frivolous, the plaintiff may still obtain a positive settlement," and that a defendant is
often willing to settle for an amount below or equal to his potential defense costs).
197.

See Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 617-18; see also, e.g., SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note

44, at 122 (reporting that 42% of will contest cases that involved redistribution of the estate
involved a car ranging in value from $10 to $1000).
198. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 619 chart 6.
199. Id Another will study suggests that even fully litigated will contests often include
settlements; five out of five contests litigated to jury verdict involved an out-of-court settlement.
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 184.

200. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 626 chart 8. This finding of "no pronounced bias
toward the proponent or contestant," id. at 627, is broadly consistent with the Priest-Klein case
selection model described above. See text accompanying notes 167-69; see also Priest & Klein,
supra note 96, at 4-5. Cf Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority
Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1312 n.51 (2003) (finding that win rates for

claims requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence were no different than win rates for
claims requiring clear-and-convincing evidence).
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high percentage.201 Nor do the data rule out a substantial number of nuisance
will contests, which favors the clear-and-convincing standard.202
By focusing on filed will contests, the reported study may have missed
settlements that avoid a court filing. Another study of wills found 203a
redistribution of the estate in 50 out of 360, or 14% of, testate cases.
204
Twenty-one redistributions involved a car, which seems an unlikely way to
resolve a potential will contest. In seventeen cases, property was redistributed
from the surviving spouse to lineal descendents or vice versa. 20 Because the
206
spousal intestate share varied from 1/3 to 3/4, these redistributions could
have preempted will contests. Of the remaining twelve redistributions, only
three appear at all likely to have been settlements of threatened will contests.207
Overall, as many as 20 out of 360 testate cases (5.6%) may have involved a
pre-filing settlement. Although this is a high estimate, it shows that examining
only filed contests may overlook a large number of settlements. But again,
without knowing the merits of the potential claims, it impossible to say
whether these settlements mirror trial outcomes or merely avoid nuisance
actions.
To summarize, although the greater uncertainty of the clear-and-convincingevidence standard may lead to more litigation, quantifying the standard could
avoid that problem. The asymmetric cost structure of will contests raises the
effective standard of proof higher than the decision rule at trial. This weighs in
favor of the preponderance standard. Pushing in the opposite direction is the
desire to avoid nuisance suits. Nuisance suits do not appear to be particularly
pronounced in will contests, but the data do not rule out the possibility that
In short, settlement substantially
they occur in significant numbers.
complicates the choice of the standard of proof.
IV. REFINING THE WORKING ANSWER

Laypeople estimate the probability required for the preponderance standard
at the same level as judges place the clear-and-convincing-evidence
no significant difference in
standard.208 In addition, mock-jury research shows
209
Therefore, the entire civil
standards.
two
plaintiff win rates between the
standard-of-proof question is meaningless without reform of 1ury instructions.
Quantified or comparative standards appear to be effective.2 If legislatures
201.

Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 613-14, 626-27.

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See id. at 613 chart 3, 614 n.33.
SUSSMAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 122-25.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 122-23 (reporting that three cases involved disinheritance or near disinheritance).

208.

See supra notes 40 & 76 and accompanying text.

209.
210.

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
See supra Part Ill.C.
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and appellate courts want any policymaking role in setting the standard of
proof, they should institute reform in that direction.
Assuming the two standards are meaningfully differentiated, which standard
is better for incapacity will contests? The working answer presented here
mirrors the standard approach of comparing the utilities of the possible
outcomes and concludes that the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard
dominates. Examining the underlying assumptions of this answer, however,
introduces some doubt as to the answer's robustness.
If one relaxes the assumption that the fallback is intestacy, the
preponderance standard would be superior when there is a prior will. That
conclusion seems relatively robust even in light of uncertainties created by the
other assumptions. Several other considerations weigh in favor of the
preponderance standard more broadly, but with unknown force. These
include: (1) testator intent is arguably not dichotomous, which would tend to
increase the utility of distribution via intestacy; (2) testator intent is arguably
not the only goal of the capacity requirement, which would similarly make
intestacy more attractive; (3) the asymmetric cost structure of will contests also
likely tilts toward preponderance; and (4) the pre onderance standard creates
marginally better incentives to produce evidence.
Against these, the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard is better than the
preponderance standard at achieving testator intent if the distribution of
testators, as seems almost certain, is skewed toward capacity. Additionally, it
reduces nuisance suits more than the preponderance standard. Introducing case
selection through the prevailing model can tilt the scale further toward the
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. An unknown consideration concerns
whether old will-studies reflect the accuracy of intestacy today, given changes
in statutes, family structures, and testators.
If forced to choose between the standards based on presently existing
information (as courts and legislators are), the case for the clear-andconvincing-evidence standard seems stronger on balance. The working answer
weighs heavily in its favor. Using conservative estimates of the utilities of the
212
four possible outcomes generates an optimal standard of 0.69, not far from
the 0.75 level associated with the clear-and-convincing standard.213 The likely
distributional skew toward capacity strengthens this finding, as does concern
211. See supra Part III for a discussion of each of these considerations.
212. If one accepts the argument for quantification, the question becomes whether the
standard should simply be set at 0.69. Indeed, more refined proof levels are already at work in
this context; recall the dizzying array of verbal formulations. See supra text accompanying notes
16-22. Some have argued that three is a magic number. Clermont, supra note 84, at 1115
(noting that the standard of proof divides into three standards, despite the fact that it may more
properly be understood as a "continuum"); see also McBaine, supra note 79, at 245-47
(discussing three burdens of persuasion). Whether more refined standards are appropriate is
outside the scope of this Article.
213.

See supra Figure 2.
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for reducing nuisance suits. On the other hand, asymmetric costs and
evidentiary incentives push toward the preponderance standard. As noted
above, asymmetric costs are potentially very important given how few cases
are litigated, but they are mitigated in this context because will litigants appear
to be motivated by factors other than money. Evidentiary incentives do not
seem particularly profound given uncertainty, risk aversion, and the other
incentives at work.
That leaves three difficult considerations. First, the will studies underlying
the simple answer are dated, but that should not disqualify them in the absence
of new data or persuasive theory about the direction of change. Second,
awarding partial credit for distributions that deviate from the testator's
preferred scheme would be arbitrary without evidence that doing so is what the
testator wants.214 Finally, if family protection is given preference in setting the
standard of proof for incapacity, then that could tilt the scales in favor of the
preponderance standard. However, as argued above, effectuating testator
intent should be the only relevant goal.215
In light of all the relevant factors, a definitive answer to the standard-ofproof question is not possible based on currently available data. There are
simply too many unknowns, pushing in opposite directions. Remaining
questions include: (1) whether partial credit should be awarded and, if so, how
much; (2) whether old will studies accurately reflect the current situation; and
(3) whether other goals are relevant. One commentator, Professor Alex Stein,
has argued that, because the preponderance standard minimizes the total
number of errors, "[a]ny deviation from this rule requires unequivocal
justification, which is hard to provide in cases not featuring asymmetric risks
of error." 216 This Article demonstrates that unequivocal justification is
214. Researchers could ask respondents not only how they would prefer their estates to be
distributed under different factual scenarios, see, e.g., Fellows et al., supra note 107, at 351 tbl.7,
but also how they feel about the intestate distribution. For example, the researcher could ask a
follow-up question to respondents who deviate from the intestate pattern. This could be phrased,
"If the distribution you just selected is given a score of 100 on a 100-point scale where 100 is
'exactly what you want' and 0 is 'totally unacceptable,' where does the following intestate
distribution fall on that scale?" Answers could help generate a more refined estimate ofI.
215. To these three considerations, one could add consistency. If the case for the
preponderance standard is relatively strong for replacement wills and codicils, consistency argues
in favor of applying it generally. See Pierce v. Pierce, 127 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tenn. 1939)
(rejecting the clear-and-convincing standard in favor of preponderance, and noting that
"[r]ecognition and application of exceptions to the fixed rules governing the proof required in
civil and criminal cases, respectively, would give rise to great confusion[]"). This argument
should not prevail; the existence of a prior will creates a bright-line rule, and lawyers who
currently practice in this area must be sensitive to standards of proof.
216.

ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 153 (2005). Accord Redmayne, supra

note 68, at 174 (arguing that the preponderance standard "should only be abandoned where the
reasons for doing so are compelling"). Elsewhere, Professor Stein appears to back away
somewhat from this statement. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93
GEO. L.J. 1743, 1758 (2005) (explaining that their "theory offers no concrete prescriptions for a

2010]

The General Theory of Standards ofProof

41

probably impossible to provide even in cases, like incapacity will contests, that
feature asymmetric costs of error.
The result should not be adoption of the preponderance standard across the
board; rather, unequivocal justification should not be required. Minimizing
errors is an attractive goal, but only because doing so will generally minimize
Professor
the cost of errors. It is the cost, not the error itself, that matters.
Stein likely would not disagree. 218 He suggests that asymmetric error costs
will, at least frequently, qualify as an unequivocal justification.219 Perhaps a
better statement of the preference for the preponderance standard is as a default
rule when error costs are nearly equal or unknown. Once asymmetric costs are
shown, the considerations outlined in this Article should be weighed, with no
strong thumb on either side of the scale.
V. POTENTIAL EXTENSIONS OF THE ANALYSIS

Three examples illustrate some broader implications of the foregoing
analysis: undue influence, fraud, and criminal law. The closest analog to
testamentary incapacity is undue influence, which, along with incapacity, is
one of the two most common grounds for will contests.2 20 There is a split
between those jurisdictions that require contestants to prove undue influence
by a preponderance of evidence and those that require clear-and-convincing
221
Substitute "probability of undue influence" for "probability of
evidence.
incapacity" and almost the entire analysis above applies. The most notable
exception is that, with undue influence, there is a wrongdoer who manipulates

perfectly tailored counterbalancing approach," such as a heightened evidentiary requirement,
"that would do exactly right on a case-by-case basis[]" and, furthermore, that such a theory is
"unattainable").
217. Cf EPSTEIN,supranote 61.
218. See STEIN, supra note 216, at 141.
219. Id at 153.
220. Schoenblum, supra note 165, at 648 chart 22 (indicating that 49 out of 66 contests, or
74%, involved undue influence claims; 48, or 73%, involved incapacity claims; and, the next
most common claim, lack of testamentary formalities, was alleged in only 9 cases, or 14%).
Undue influence is a slippery concept, but it has been defined as follows: "[a] donative transfer is
procured by undue influence if the wrongdoer exerted such influence over the donor that it
overcame the donor's free will and caused the donor to make a donative transfer that the donor
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
would not otherwise have made."
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3(b) (2003).
There obviously can be overlap between incapacity and undue influence. Fraud is also a basis
for will contests and may, too, overlap with the other two contest grounds. A definitive answer to
the question of which standard of proof is optimal for any one of these grounds would have to
account for their potential interchangeability. Such second-order effects are outside the scope of
this Article.
221. ROSS & REED, supra note 19, § 7:12, at 7-76 to 7-79 nn.17-18 (listing authority from
twenty-nine states following the preponderance rule and authority from fourteen states requiring
clear-and-convincing evidence).
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the content of the will. 222 Recall the previous discussion that attempted to
estimate how often wills executed by incapacitated testators reflect their intent
by subdividing such "bad" wills into innocent mistakes and intentional
With undue influence there are no innocent mistakes;
malfeasance.
accordingly, there is good reason to think that B is very close to 0.223 This
weakens the case for the clear-and-convincing standard. It is, therefore,
somewhat surprising that more than twice as many states (fourteen) apply the
heightened standard to undue-influence claimS 224 than to incapacity claims
(six).225 (In light of the overlapping issues that these claims implicate, it is not
surprising that all 6 of those states requiring clear-and-convincing evidence of
incapacity require the same of undue influence.)226
A second example may shed light on the anomaly that, in many states, it is
more difficult to prove undue influence than incapacity. Professor Stein
justifies the application of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to civil
claims of fraud on the ground that an individual found to have committed fraud
suffers a social sanction in addition to a legal one. 2 27 The heightened standard
of proof avoids over-deterrence by reducing the probability of a finding of
fraud2.228 In the terms of this Article, Stein argues that the utility of true and
false positives is lower for fraud cases than for other civil actions because a
fraud finding has the negative effect of over-deterrence. Equation 4 shows that
the optimal-proof standard necessarily rises as the utility of positive findings
declines; Stein, therefore, is on the right track.229 However, his account falls
far short of a justification for the fraud standard.
Even within the standard statistical approach, one needs to know how large
the effect of over-deterrence is. If the utility of positive findings decreases
only slightly, the preponderance standard may still prove more effective than
the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.23o Depending on the magnitude
of the effect of over-deterrence, the amount of fraud may be relevant. The
greater the court's error rate, the greater the effect would have to be to justify
222. Id. § 7:1, at 7-3.
223. Id. (demonstrating that innocent, mistaken conduct will not inculpate an individual
under the undue influence standard).
224. Ross & REED, supra note 19, § 7:12, at 7-79 n.18. This treatise places Iowa and Ohio
on both sides of the divide. Id. (1999 & Supp. 2010). However, the authority it cites puts both
states in the preponderance camp. See In re Estate of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273 (Iowa 1998); West
v. Lucas, 139 N.E. 859 (Ohio 1922).
225. ROSs & REED, supra note 19, § 6:14, at 6-67 n.39, 6-75 n.43.
226. Id. § 7:12, at 7-76 n.17, 7-79 n.18. Section 7:12 lists Louisiana citations in support of
both standards, id, but the controlling statute indicates that the state applies the clear-andconvincing-evidence standard. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1483 (2000).
227. STEIN, supra note 216. Accord Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
228.

STEIN, supra note 216.

229. Id; see supra Equation 4.
230. In this sense, Stein fails his own unequivocal-evidence test. STEIN, supra note 216. In
fairness, Stein may have intended to offer an explanation rather than a full justification.
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deviation from the preponderance standard. All of this assumes an agreedupon metric that measures deterrence along with all other purposes of the law
of fraud. My own tentative view is that a heightened standard of proof for
fraud is probably not justified.
Regardless, the fraud issue sheds light on undue influence. Being found
guilty of undue influence likely carries a social sanction similar to being found
guilty of fraud. With undue influence, however, avoiding over-deterrence is
even more important because the boundary between good and bad behavior is
less clear. 23 1 It is not wrong for a child to ask his parent to be remembered in
her will, and some testators may need and want assistance from individuals
who are also beneficiaries. The same concern with over-deterrence that arises
in fraud cases is therefore magnified in undue influence cases, and this weighs
heavily in favor of a heightened standard for undue influence. 232
Similarly, a criminal conviction could inflict social as well as legal harm, but
the emphasis of those who defend the reasonable doubt standard is usually
different; the cost of convicting an innocent person is greater than the cost of
acquitting a guilty person. 233 Judge Richard Posner attributes this disparity, in
part, to the high cost of imprisonment. 234 This is obviously a direct application
of the standard statistical approach. 235 Judge Posner, like Professor Stein,
makes no attempt to quantify the relative costs of errors. 236 Moreover, some
have argued that, in the criminal context, it is not possible to quantify either the
utilities or the standard.23 7
Judge Posner offers a second argument in favor of the reasonable-doubt
standard-inequality of resources.23 Because the government generally has a
large advantage in resources, the high burden is needed to level the playing
231. Id.
232. Even without that concern, however, this Article suggests that there is a reasonably
strong case for the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for undue influence.
233.

See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L.

REV. 1477, 1504 (1999). Even those who criticize this rationale cite the costs of false convictions
in favor of the high standard. See Richard Lempert, The Economic Analysis of Evidence Law:

Common Sense on Stilts, 87 VA. L. REV. 1619, 1665 (2001) (relying on "an aspiration to never
convict innocent people and a moral judgment about the wrongfulness of inflicting the pain of
criminal conviction on people who are not guilty of crimes").
234. POSNER, supra note 193, § 22.4, at 648. Note, however, that the reasonable-doubt
standard applies to all crimes, not just those leading to imprisonment. See, e.g., Dept. of Rev. of
Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 778 (1994) ("A government may not impose criminal fines
without first establishing guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.").
235. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
236. See Posner,supra note 233, at 1504-07.
237. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Nev. 1983) ("The concept of
reasonable doubt is inherently qualitative. Any attempt to quantify may impermissibly lower the
prosecution's burden of proof, and is likely to confuse rather than clarify."); Lillquist, supra note
60, at 91 ("[T]he traditional understanding wrongly assumes that we know how to weigh these
costs and benefits.").
238. Posner, supra note 233, at 1505.
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field. Recall the discussion above of asymmetric costs in will contests. 239The
proponent of the will has a resource advantage because the costs of litigation
come from the estate instead of out of the proponent's pocket.240 This
advantage supports an argument for a lower standard of proof to make the
contestant's life easier. In criminal law, the situation is reversed; it is the
prosecution that has superior resources, and this, argues Judge Posner, militates
in favor of requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.241
Moreover, although the government's resources in any particular case will
vastly outstrip those of an individual defendant, prosecutorial resources are
insufficient to cover every crime. Therefore, prosecutors will draw defendants
from among the suspects most likely to be convicted if tried-in other words,
those most likely to be guilty.242 In making this argument, Judge Posner
demonstrates sensitivity to the importance of the underlying distribution and
case selection. 243 But his argument justifies a lower, not higher, standard of
proof. This Article demonstrated above that a leftward merits skew generally
favors a higher standard of proof.244 All else equal, a rightward skew like the
one Judge Posner identifies should have the opposite impact on the selection of
the standard of proof.245
Judge Posner only briefly mentions the potential that a high standard of
proof may reduce the probability of conviction and thus the disincentive to
246
This is analogous to the incentive effects identified above:
commit crime.
greater security from the clear-and-convincin-evidence standard should mean
Judge Posner's inattention is
more wills and wills executed later in life.
particularly remarkable because, only a few pages later, he argues that prodefendant Supreme Court precedent on other issues "would have reduced the
expected cost of punishment, and so driven crime rates even higher." 248 In
fairness, Judge Posner may believe that the resource constraint is so severe that
it drives the conviction rate independent of the standard of proof.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article posed a very specific question: in will contests alleging
incapacity, which standard of proof-preponderance of the evidence or clear
and convincing evidence-is better? There were reasons to think a definitive
answer was achievable. First, there is a basic agreement that advancing
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra Part III.J.
See, e.g., TEX. PROBATE CODE ANN. § 243 (West 2003).
POSNER, supra note 193, § 22.4, at 648-49.
Id. at 649.

243.

See id.

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

See supra text accompanying note 59.
See POSNER, supra note 193, § 22.4, at 648.
See id.
See supra Part Ill.B.
POSNER, supra note 193, § 22.4, at 649-50.
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testator intent is the primary goal of the law of wills. Second, studies have
examined how well the fallback system of intestacy matched testator intent.
And third, the base rate of incapacity is almost certainly low. But these facts
were not enough to definitively find in favor of one standard. The final answer
was necessarily equivocal, but exposed previously unrecognized factors that
are relevant in selecting any standard of proof.
Perhaps most important is the need for sensitivity to the effects of
settlement. One cannot simply assume that settlements will mirror trial
outcomes. The asymmetric cost structure of will contests is just one example
of why a myopic focus on trial results may be inadequate.
Some
understanding of the merits distribution can also affect the choice of a standard
of proof. As in will contests, it may not be necessary to know the precise
distribution; it may be sufficient simply to know the likely direction of the
skew. And, although there were difficulties measuring the utilities of the four
outcomes, this Article suggests that this basic problem may not be intractable,
at least in some contexts.
An important thread of this Article's argument is that standard of proof
instructions should be clarified. The whole question of which standard to
apply is almost meaningless if jurors cannot differentiate among the standards,
as appears presently to be the case. More precise language may suffice, but a
numerical approach deserves serious consideration.
Perhaps the biggest contribution of this Article is to present a more complete
framework through which to evaluate standards of proof.
Leading
commentators have at times recognized some of the relevant considerations,
but more often they have failed to examine critical assumptions and, in some
cases, they have cited considerations in favor one standard of proof when they
actually support another. To be fair, precision of result may necessarily be
elusive in this area, but precision of analysis is not. And although this
Article's framework is presented in probabilistic terms, the lessons learned are
applicable to other approaches to standards of proof.
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